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Abstract
We exploit a unique historical setting to study the long-run effects of forced migration on invest-
ment in education. After World War II, the Polish borders were redrawn, resulting in large-scale
migration. Poles were forced to move from the Kresy territories in the East (taken over by the
USSR) and were resettled mostly to the newly acquired Western Territories, from which Germans
were expelled. We combine historical censuses with newly collected survey data to show that,
while there were no pre-WWII differences in education, Poles with a family history of forced mi-
gration are significantly more educated today. Descendants of forced migrants have on average
one extra year of schooling, driven by a higher propensity to finish secondary or higher education.
This result holds when we restrict ancestral locations to a subsample around the Kresy border and
include fixed effects for the destination of migrants. Since Kresy migrants were of the same ethnic-
ity and religion as other Poles, we bypass confounding factors of other cases of forced migration.
We show that labor market competition with natives and selection of migrants are also unlikely to
drive our results. Survey evidence suggests that forced migration led to a shift in preferences, away
from material possessions and towards investment in a mobile asset – human capital. The effects
persist over three generations.
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“And so it happened that ... the marshall came: ‘Leave’ — ‘But where should I go?’— ‘To
Poland.’ And I say: ‘I am in Poland.’ And he says: ‘This is not Poland anymore.’ ”1
1 Introduction
Forced migration is a life-changing experience, leaving deep scars in the memory of expellees.
Does the experience affect also subsequent generations? In his bestselling autobiographical novel,
Amos Oz writes “It was always like that with Jewish families: they believed that education was
an investment for the future, the only thing that no one can [...] take away from your children,
even if, God forbid, there’s another war, ... another migration” (p. 172; Oz, 2005). The idea that
forced migration may affect preferences for education has been attributed by Stigler and Becker
(1977) to Chicago economist Reuben Kessel. This argument has not only been made for Jews,
but more generally – for example, in the academic literature by Brenner and Kiefer (1981): “a
group which had been compelled to emigrate from a country might take the portability of an asset
into consideration when making an investment in a new country.” However, this “uprootedness”
hypothesis has proved hard to test. Even for the most prominent case – that of the Jews – Botticini
and Eckstein (2012) have convincingly challenged the idea that expulsion and discrimination are
the main drivers of their educational lead.2 It is notoriously difficult to identify the link between
forced migration and investment in education. Forced migrants typically differ from locals along
other socio-economic and cultural characteristics such as ethnicity, language, and religion. In
addition, labor market competition with locals often affects educational choices of migrants.
In this paper, we explore a unique historical setting that allows us to study the effect of forced
migration on human capital investment, absent the typical confounding factors. We study popu-
lation transfers of millions of Poles in the aftermath of WWII when Polish frontiers were moved
westward. Figure 1 illustrates the re-drawing of Poland’s borders. The former Eastern Polish ter-
ritories (Kresy) became part of the Soviet Union, while the former German areas – the Western
Territories (WT) – became Polish. The latter had been home to about 8 million Germans before
WWII, who had to resettle, leaving land and capital stock behind, with only about one million
native Poles remaining there. In the East, Poles were forced to leave the Kresy territories, and the
vast majority of them resettled in the largely emptied Western Territories. We can thus shed light
on the long-run effects of uprootedness, by comparing the descendants of Poles who were forced
to migrate with all other Poles – of the same ethnicity, language, and religion.
1Testimony cited in an exhibition of the Polish History Museum devoted to forced migrants from Kresy. See
Appendix I for detail and sample photographs.
2They argue that Jewish preferences for education are explained by religious motives: Jewish boys were expected
to read the Torah. These preferences trace back to the time of the fall of the second temple in Jerusalem (in 70 CE),
before Jews started to be repeatedly expelled.
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We cooperated with the Polish social survey ‘Diagnoza’ to include questions about respon-
dents’ ancestors from Kresy in their 2015 wave. Among the almost 30,000 respondents, more than
11% had ancestors from Kresy. We find that descendants of forced migrants have significantly
higher education today, as compared to all other Poles. The education advantage of descendants
of forced migrants is quantitatively important: They have on average one extra year of school-
ing, driven by a higher propensity to finish secondary or higher education. Importantly, education
levels of forced migrants were not higher before WWII. Figure 2 illustrates the reversal in the
education of Poles from Kresy and their descendants: Before WWII, when Poland consisted of
the Kresy territories and Central Poland (CP), Poles in the former had, if anything, lower literacy
rates. In contrast, in today’s Poland, people with ancestors from Kresy have substantially higher
rates of secondary education.3 This receives further support when we examine the educational
advantage of Kresy descendants by birth cohorts: Figure 3 shows that those forced migrants who
had likely finished school by the time they were expelled from Kresy (i.e., the cohort born before
1930) do not differ from other Poles in terms of their education. For younger cohorts, we find a
significant education advantage of Kresy descendants, even for those born two generations after
their ancestors had been expelled.4
The Diagnoza Survey contains only information about ancestors from Kresy, but not about
other ancestors. This may lead to recall bias if more educated respondents are more likely to re-
member the location of origin of their ancestors in general – and thus ancestors from Kresy in
particular. To address this, we conducted an additional Ancestry Survey in 2016 in the Western
Territories, where the majority of Kresy migrants were transported after WWII. We asked a repre-
sentative sample of about 4,000 respondents about the origin location of all their ancestors (from
the generation of youngest adults in 1939). We obtained the detailed location of almost 12,000
ancestors from all over Poland, as well as from Kresy. Using these data, we show that our results
are not affected by recall bias. In addition, the Ancestry Survey allows us to compare the educa-
tion levels of the descendants of forced migrants from Kresy, of voluntary migrants from Central
Poland, and of Poles who had already lived in WT before the war (autochthons). We find that
descendants of migrants from Kresy are the most educated, followed by descendants of voluntary
migrants. Descendants of autochthons are the least educated group in Poland’s Western Territories
today.
The detailed ancestor locations reported in our Ancestry Survey also allow us to confirm our
3We use the share of people with a secondary degree in Figure 2 because it is comparable to literacy rates in 1921
in terms of its nationwide average. Among the respondents in our surveys, the rate of primary education is above 99%,
without any meaningful variation. In our empirical analysis, we use years of schooling as the main outcome variable.
4The results shown in Figure 3 use fixed effects for respondents’ county of residence today. These absorb potential
local differences in the education system and in the labor market environment.
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main results in a particularly restrictive border sample analysis. We restrict the sample to people
whose ancestors in 1939 lived within less than 150 kilometers on either side of the Kresy border. At
the same time, we include municipality fixed effects for the location of today’s survey respondents.
We find that among respondents who live in the same town or village today, those whose ancestors
lived in Kresy, a few kilometers to the east of the Kresy border, have significantly higher education
today than those whose ancestors lived in Central Poland, a few kilometers to the west of the Kresy
border.
We examine two potential threats to identification: First, pre-existing differences – people from
Kresy may have had higher education or different preferences for education already before WWII.
Second, selection – people from either Kresy or from other parts of the country may have differ-
entially selected into specific locations or occupations. We use a combination of historical data,
survey data, and border discontinuity analyses to address these concerns. We then examine several
possible mechanisms behind our results. Using both historical sources and empirical analysis, we
document that Kresy migrants did not have differential access to resources, schooling, or employ-
ment opportunities at their destination locations. Their is also no indication that congested labor
markets, differential fertility, out-migration, or economic conditions at destinations confound our
results. We conclude that a shift in preferences towards investment in human capital is the most
likely explanation for our findings.5
We support this interpretation by survey evidence, showing that descendants of forced migrants
value material goods less, while having a stronger aspiration for education of their children. They
also possess fewer physical assets, relative to the number of physical assets they can afford. Histor-
ical narratives from the time of expulsions corroborate our survey evidence, suggesting a change
in preferences towards education. The Western Institute in Poznan (Instytut Zachodni) collected
memoirs written by re-settlers in Western Territories in the 1950s, some of which were subse-
quently published and analyzed by historians. For example, the memoir by a forced migrant from
Kresy, who came from a simple peasant family, reads: “In Western Territories, there was a specific
situation. People did not attach great importance to material wealth. After all, nobody had it at
that time ... most of the people who came here were still living in the memories of places of their
origin and of material things that had belonged to their families for generations. In a new life
situation, the cult of new values emerged, i.e., values that are indestructible, that cannot be lost,
and that die with the man – the cult of knowledge, of skills, which can resist cataclysms” (Bieniasz
(1987), as cited in Halicka (2015), p. 262). The former president of Poland (2010-15) Bronisław
Komorowski emphasized in an interview how these values were passed on in families. “I was born
5At the end of the appendix, we provide a ‘Guide to Identification and Mechanisms’ with summary tables that
schematize the corresponding evidence.
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near Wrocław [the former German Breslau], in the house of grandparents Komorowski who had
come there from Vilnius [in Kresy]... At home, nobody attached any importance to the material
side, because everything that was valuable had been lost” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 June 2017).
Our interpretation is consistent with recent evidence pointing to how preferences can adjust
to shocks to environmental or institutional conditions and persist in subsequent generations. A
robust body of evidence has described how individual preferences change in response to exposure
to violence, natural disasters, or economic shocks.6 Recent evidence suggests that these effects
persist in future generations.7
Our work is related to a large literature that studies the economic effects of migration. This
research typically focuses on two broad topics: the effect of migrants on short-run and long-run
economic outcomes at their destinations, and socio-economic effects on migrants themselves and
on their descendants.8 This literature studies both voluntary and forced migration.9 Key drivers of
forced migration are natural disasters, international wars, and civil wars.10 Finally, a large body
of work has examined the effects of voluntary migration, for instance in the context of the Age of
Mass Migration to the US (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson, 2014; Sequeira, Nunn, and Qian,
2019).11
6See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review of the literature on exposure to violence, and Voors, Nillesen,
Verwimp, Bulte, Lensink, and van Soest (2012), Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, and Henrich (2014), Cassar, Grosjean, and
Whitt (2013), or Jakiela and Ozier (2019) for more recent contributions. On natural disasters, see Cameron and Shah
(2015), Cassar, Healy, and von Kessler (2017), and Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe (2018). On economic shocks,
c.f. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), Fisman, Jakiela, and Kariv (2015), and Malmendier and Nagel (2016).
7Zhang (2018) documents systematic differences in preferences for competition among current Chinese high
school students, depending on whether their grandparents or great-grandparents were exposed to state-imposed gender-
egalitarian policies in the 1950s. Going back many more generations, Galor and Özak (2016) document systematic
variations in time preferences among present-day populations related to changes in agro-climatic conditions during
the Columbian exchange, more than five centuries ago.
8See the comprehensive discussions in Borjas (2014), Card and Peri (2016) and Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler
(2016) for short-run effects; for evidence of the long-run effects of migrants at their destinations see Hornung (2014),
Peters (2017), and Murard and Sakalli (2018). Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara (2012) provide an overview of the
literature on second-generation immigrants. Katz and Rapoport (2005) build a model that formalizes how forced
migration can lead to a shift away from investing in physical capital toward investing in human capital.
9The literature on the effects of forced migration is surveyed in Becker and Ferrara (2019). For example, Card
(1990), Borjas and Monras (2017), Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian (2015), and Braun and Omar Mahmoud (2014) use
forced migration to identify the effect of migration on economic outcomes at the destination.
10Many papers examine relatively short-run effects of natural disasters. For instance, Sacerdote (2012) looks at the
effects on test scores of students displaced from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Nakamura, Sigurdsson, and
Steinsson (2017) study the labour market outcomes of families displaced by the eruption of a volcano on an island off
the coast of Iceland in 1973. Jacob (2004) and Chyn (2018) exploit exogenous variation in mobility caused by public
housing demolitions in Chicago. While neither paper finds effects on educational attainment, displaced children have
better labour market outcomes as adults.
11Bazzi, Gaduh, Rothenberg, and Wong (2016) study lottery-driven variation in voluntary migration during peace
times in Indonesia to show that farmers are more productive in destination locations with agroclimatic endowments
similar to where they come from.
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Our focus is on the long-term effects of forced migration after WWII, in the generations of chil-
dren, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of adult expellees. In the context of forced migration
due to WWII, two related papers are Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka (2013) and Sarvimäki, Uusitalo,
and Jäntti (2019). Bauer et al. (2013) study the economic integration of Germans expelled from
Poland’s Western Territories into West Germany. They find that migrant children tend to acquire
more education than their native peers. The main mechanism behind this finding is congestion:
Former farming families had to look for work outside agriculture because agricultural land in West
Germany was already held by native Germans. We show below that this mechanism is unlikely
to be at play in the largely emptied Western Territories. Sarvimäki et al. (2019) study the forced
migration of 11% of the Finnish population after the Soviet invasion in 1939. Their focus is on
income as the main variable of interest.
Relative to the existing literature, we make several contributions. First, we test the prominent
hypothesis, untested by the previous literature, that uprootedness leads to human capital invest-
ment. Uprootedness is arguably a contributing factor to numerous studies on forced migration,
such as Nakamura et al. (2017), Bauer et al. (2013), Sarvimäki et al. (2019). Thus, in terms of
external validity our study has implications beyond the specific context of Poland. Second, we
analyze the hitherto unstudied mass population movements in post-WWII Poland, where Poles
expelled from Eastern Territories (Kresy) were resettled into the largely empty ex-German West-
ern Territories. This unique setting allows us to bypass common confounding factors associated
with forced migration, such as different ethnicity, language, or religion, as well as congested labor
markets. Third, we break new ground by studying the long-run effects of forced migration on the
descendants of migrants over several generations. This is of high policy relevance in a world with
large waves of forced displacement. Finally, our results suggest that caution is warranted in the
prominent approach that uses forced migration as an instrument to estimate the effect of voluntary
migration – this instrument may have a direct effect on outcomes via a change in preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical background,
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 shows the main results using the two surveys. Section 5
examines threats to identification, such as (potential) selection of migrants, and 6 presents evidence
on mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Historical Background
2.1 The Change of Poland’s Borders
Poland’s Borders before 1945
Poland’s borders have seen several changes over the last 500 years. The Polish Lithuanian Com-
monwealth (PLC) was established in 1569 when the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania formed a union that lasted for over 200 years. In 1795, Poland lost its statehood as
its territory was split among three European empires: Russia, Prussia, and Austro-Hungary. No
sovereign Polish state existed until 1918; this period of Polish history is known as the ‘Partitions
of Poland.’ At the end of World War I, the independent Polish state was recreated as the Second
Polish Republic (SPR). Poland ceased to exist again as an independent state at the beginning of
WWII, when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded the SPR in September 1939, splitting it
according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Poland’s Borders after 1945
At the end of World War II, an independent Poland reemerged within new borders that moved
Poland 200 kilometers to the West. These new borders were established in accordance with the
decisions taken during the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences. Poland gained the former
German territories of Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia, called by the communist propaganda
“Recovered Territories” and later “Western Territories” (WT). At the same time, Poland lost the
Eastern Borderlands, known as Kresy, located to the east of the Curzon line (more detail below).
The Kresy territory was divided among the Soviet Republics of Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine.
Figure 1 illustrates the change in Polish borders.12
Henceforth, we refer to the part of Poland that belonged to the Second Polish Republic before
WWII and continued to be Polish after WWII as ‘Central Poland.’ Thus, the territory of Poland
before WWII was comprised of Central Poland and Kresy, whereas the Polish territory after WWII
is comprised of Central Poland (CP) and WT. The 1931 Polish Census – the last census of the SPR –
counts about 3 million ethnic Poles in Kresy. Before WWII, according to the 1939 German census,
8.8 million people lived in areas that after WWII became the Polish Western Territories. Almost
90% of them declared to be ‘German,’ 10% were Poles, and about 1% Jews (Dziewanowski, 1977).
12The Eastern border of the Second Polish Republic was established at the signature of the peace treaty in Riga
which marked the end of the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921. The borders of the Second Polish Republic around
Silesia and East Prussia were adjusted as a result of several referenda in 1920-1922. Throughout the analysis and on
the map, we consider the final SPR border as of 1922.
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Arbitrariness of the Kresy border of 1945
The Kresy border (i.e., the post-WWII Eastern border of Poland) was established roughly along
the Curzon line after many discussions between Stalin and the Allies. The Curzon line, in turn, had
been suggested as an armistice line in a note by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during the
1920 Polish-Soviet conflict – a suggestion that was then disregarded by both Poland and the Soviet
Union. The 1921 Treaty of Riga instead provided Poland with land that – on average – was about
250 kilometers eastward of the Curzon line. The Curzon line also did not correspond to the border
between Germany and the Soviet Union according to the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of
1939; after the military defeat of Poland in September 1939, the Soviet Union annexed territories
extending well to the west of the Curzon line – as far as Lublin and Warsaw. Nor did the Curzon
line divide geographically diverse areas: There is no discontinuity in geo-climatic characteristics
such as precipitation, temperature, elevation, terrain ruggedness, or in suitability for various crops
(see Appendix V.1).
After recapturing Eastern Poland from Germany in 1944, the Soviets unilaterally declared
the new border between Poland and the Soviet Union approximately along the Curzon line, to
which the Allies ultimately conceded at the Yalta conference.13 Historians of Poland agree that the
post-WWII border between Poland and the USSR, which we henceforth refer to as Kresy border,
was arbitrary. For example, Davies (1981, p. 493) writes: “All decisions regarding the Polish
frontiers were taken ad hoc[...] No attempt to trim the frontiers to the wishes of the population ever
succeeded, [...] it was decided in 1944–5 to trim the population to the requirements of arbitrary
frontiers.”
Poles in Kresy and Central Poland before WWII
In the context of our study, a relevant question is whether Poles from Kresy were exposed to
radically different experiences than Poles from other regions already before WWII. In the two
periods when Poland was a sovereign state – PLC in 1569-1795 and SPR in 1918-39 – Poles had
the same rights in all parts of the country. Namely, Poles who lived in what later became Kresy and
Poles who lived in what later became Central Poland had exactly the same status (Davies, 1981).
In contrast, during the Partitions of Poland, the living conditions and the rights of Poles differed
across the three empires (e.g., Davies, 1981; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). The Russian and
the Austro-Hungarian Partitions stretched over parts of Kresy and parts of Central Poland. Within
13In Appendix I.3 we give more detail on different variants of the Curzon Line that were under consideration. In
Table A.12, we show that our results hold when we restrict our sample to counties that different versions of the Curzon
line placed on different sides of the border, i.e., counties that could have become Polish or Soviet territories, depending
on the different variants of the Curzon line.
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these two Partitions, Poles had the same rights irrespective of whether (or not) they lived in Kresy.14
Overall, Poles in Kresy faced differential discrimination (as compared to Poles in other parts of
Poland) only once – when they were forced to move from Kresy at the end of WWII.
2.2 Post-WWII Mass Population Movements
As a result of the change of borders after WWII, mass population movements occurred. At the end
of WWII, an estimated 2.5-3.4 million Germans (who had not fled as the Red Army advanced), and
1 million Poles were still located in the Western Territories (Dziewanowski, 1977). The remaining
Germans were expelled from WT and had to resettle in Germany to the west of the Oder-Neisse
line. Importantly, Polish and Soviet authorities had agreed on a mass population exchange follow-
ing the change of the borders, according to which Poles from Kresy were forced to resettle within
the new Poland, while Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians had to leave Poland and resettle
in the USSR. These mass movements of people began in 1944 and were largely completed by 1948
(e.g., Schechtman, 1962; Eberhardt, 2003).
The population exchange agreements were signed between the so-called Polish Committee of
National Liberation – a puppet provisional government of Poland controlled by the Soviet Union –
and the governments of the three Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania (Ciesiel-
ski, 1999). The official language of these agreements did not explicitly specify that the ethnic
groups in question were to be expelled from the two respective sides of the Curzon line. However,
historians agree that the members of these groups had no viable alternative but to move – this was
also driven by the Polish and Soviet authorities seeking to quickly create irreversibility, by moving
populations according to the new frontiers (c.f. Davies, 1981; Kersten, 1986).
Forced migration from Kresy territories
By 1950, 2.1 million Poles had been forced to move from the Kresy territories. The Polish State
Repatriation Bureau tried to ensure an orderly movement of Poles from Kresy directly to WT.
However, this was hard to implement because of the war-related devastation, destruction of infras-
tructure, and the lack of adequate transport. Approximately one quarter of Kresy migrants settled
in Central Poland, many of whom had family ties there. The aim of the Polish authorities was to
resettle Kresy deportees in those places in the Western Territories that had soil and climatic condi-
tions most closely resembling the conditions at the origin locations, which in practice meant that
trains brought people to the Western Territories from Kresy along the same latitude. Kresy Poles
14Below, in Section 6.2, we show that our results hold when we restrict the sample to ancestors who lived within
the former Russian Partition of Poland (which covered about three quarters of the Kresy territory and one-half of
the territory of Central Poland). The Prussian Partition did not include any part of Kresy, and the Austro-Hungarian
Partition covered about one-quarter of Kresy (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). We also show that exposure to
violence during WWII does not drive our results.
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had to leave most but not all of their possessions behind. Each family was allowed up to two tons
of luggage.
Even though historians agree that Poles were forced to move from Kresy, not everybody left
during the post-war population exchange.15 In 1945-1946, authorities in the Lithuanian and Be-
lorussian SSR were concerned that agricultural production could be halted by a drop in agricultural
labor and tried to prevent Poles in rural areas from leaving. In contrast, Ukrainian authorities did
not attempt to prevent rural Poles from leaving due to the high levels of animosity between Poles
and Ukrainians at the end of WWII (e.g., Ciesielski, 1999). In all three Soviet republics, pressure
on the urban Polish population to leave was high. We exploit the urban vs. rural and Ukraine vs.
rest-of-Kresy variation below.
Voluntary migration from Central Poland
Despite war-related destruction, land, housing, infrastructure, and capital stock were abundant af-
ter the expulsion of the German population from WT. Before the war, these territories had been
densely populated. This made the Western Territories an attractive destination for voluntary mi-
grants from Central Poland, who sought a better fortune than in their homeland: Deprivation and
poverty were the main drivers of migration from Central Poland (Zaremba, 2012, p. 97). The
flow of migrants from CP started as early as in the spring of 1945. Some of this early voluntary
migration was spontaneous (mostly from the neighbouring Polish areas, sometimes on foot, or by
horse carts and trucks), some was triggered by an advertising campaign organised by the Polish
authorities that promoted a move to WT in order to populate the newly acquired land as quickly as
possible. The campaign advertised the Western Territories as the land of abundant resources (see
Figure A.3 in the appendix). As a result of this campaign, voluntary migrants came to WT from
all over Central Poland, many of whom traveled long distances by train (Zaremba, 2012).
Aggregate statistics on mass population movements
The first full post-WWII population census in Poland of 1950 provides information on the mass
population movements as of this date. In addition to statistics typically collected during censuses, it
provides information about the mass movements of the Polish population by asking about the place
15The Socialist propaganda tried to suggest that “repatriates” returned voluntarily to their “mother country.” As
Ther (1996, p. 783) points out, the contrary was true. Kresy Poles regarded Eastern Poland as their mała ojczyzna
(homeland). “These ‘repatriates’ did not return to their home country but were forcibly relocated to the former
territories of a foreign country.” Ther goes on to explain why the Socialist propaganda was convenient also for
Western politics: “One possible explanation for the success of Eastern propaganda can perhaps best be described as
‘bad conscience.’ Since Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to the expulsion of the Eastern Poles
without even consulting the Polish government, the West was prone to accept a rosy version of Polish postwar history.”
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of residence before September 1, 1939.16 Table 1 reports aggregate statistics from the 1950 census
about the origin of the Polish population, separately in the Western Territories and in Central
Poland. Of the total 24.6 million Polish population in 1950, 23% (5.6m) lived in WT. Within
the Western Territories, about 50% (2.8m) came from Central Poland, 28% (1.6m) came from
Kresy, and 20% (1.1m) were autochthons, i.e., Poles who had lived in WT when these territories
belonged to Germany before the war. The remaining 2.7% came from other countries, mostly from
France. Within Central Poland, 96.5% (18.4m) of the population had CP origin and only 3% (about
583,000) came from Kresy. Very few inhabitants of CP came from WT or from abroad (0.1% and
0.3%, respectively).
Importantly, post-WWII Poland was largely an ethnically and religiously homogeneous coun-
try, composed of ethnic Poles of Roman Catholic faith that differed only in their pre-WWII region
of residence. The Western Territories, as the rest of Poland, were also ethnically and religiously
homogenous: According to the 1950 census, 96% of WT’s population were Poles, i.e., Roman
Catholics and Polish native speakers. The rest of WT’s population in 1950 were Jews, most of
whom subsequently left (fewer than 300,000 Polish Jews survived WWII, and some had come to
WT right after the war), and Ukrainians, who were forced migrants from CP to WT (during the
so-called “Operation Vistula” – c.f. Snyder, 1999).
The arrival of migrants to the Western Territories
Upon arrival to Western Territories, Poles (irrespective of whether they came from Kresy or Cen-
tral Poland) were allocated land, housing, and capital that expelled Germans had left behind. In
rural areas, this primarily meant houses, land plots, and agricultural machines; in urban areas –
apartments, townhouses, shops, and office buildings. Initially, the Polish administration was very
weak and operated under conditions of chaos, confusion, and lack of rules. There was no register
of available properties, and people were more or less free to find and claim a place. During this
first period, the capital goods left by Germans were distributed on a first come, first serve basis.
“The Polish settlers were searching houses that were available and not reserved for other Poles...
they were registering them with the local administration and – if there were no counter-arguments
– could settle there” (Halicka, 2015, p. 203). When institutions and the Polish administration
became stronger, authorities began to organize the distribution of land and capital. The arrival of
migrants in WT coincided with the land reform in 1944-48. Migrants to rural areas typically got
lots of 8-10 hectares per family; larger estates were parceled out among several families (Davies,
16In particular, respondents indicated if they had lived within the post-WWII Polish borders, and if so, in which
region (voivodeship). If in 1939, respondents had lived outside the borders of post-WWII Poland, they had to indicate
the country in which their 1939 place of living was located in 1950. Thus, forced Kresy migrants indicated that they
lived in the USSR before the war.
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1981, p. 559). The peasants became owners of their land for an equivalent of a one-year harvest
payable in several installments. Large farms of more than 100 hectares in WT (and more than
50 hectares in Central Poland) were transformed into State Agricultural Farms. After 1956, de-
collectivization reduced the number of collective farms but they remained important in WT. The
houses and flats left by Germans were nationalized, and settlers got lifetime rental contracts.
Forced Kresy migrants and voluntary migrants from Central Poland arrived to the Western
Territories at the same time. They were treated equally upon arrival because all migrants helped to
achieve the main objective of the Polish authorities – to populate the Western Territories as quickly
as possible (Schechtman, 1962, p. 213). As the deputy minister of Public Administration wrote
to the Central Party Committee in May 1945: “The assessment of the organizational capacity of
the Polish Nation abroad, and the security of our Western borders, will depend upon our capacity
to populate and develop the area in the West” (cited in Halicka, 2015, p. 184). The Ministry of
Recovered Territories collected statistics on the rates of arrival of migrants by month during 1946
and 1947. Figure A.6 in the appendix visualizes these data, showing that the share of migrant
inflow from Kresy was about 40-50% throughout this two-year window. By the end of 1947, the
Kresy migration of the first repatriation wave came to an end. In Appendix VII.2 we discuss the
so-called second repatriation of Poles from the USSR in 1955-1959, which amounted to about
10% of all Kresy migrants.
2.3 Uncertainty Perceived by Kresy Migrants and its Connection with Education
Historical and journalistic accounts of re-settlements into Western Territories suggest that forced
migrants perceived a higher degree of uncertainty than other settlers or autochthons. The fate of the
Western Territories was viewed as uncertain by its inhabitants because of the lack of a legal guar-
antee for the Polish-German border.17 The prominent Polish sociologist Zdzisław Mach describes
this in an interview to the leading Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza: “Settlers did not feel that
the land they found was given to them forever. Until the 70s it was not certain that the Western Ter-
ritories would remain part of Poland. ...Władysław Gomułka [the first Communist Party secretary]
...did not invest in the Western Territories because at heart he was not sure what would happen to
them... It is not a random expression that the first generation of re-settlers were living on suitcases.
They never felt sure and secure...” (Gazeta Wyborcza, Dec 29, 2010). Because of their traumatic
experience of the previous expulsion, settlers from Kresy were particularly worried that Germany
17Until 1950, a mere memorandum of the Potsdam Conference guided the demarcation of the border along the
Oder-Neisse line. In 1950, East Germany and socialist Poland signed the first bilateral treaty legalizing the Oder-
Neisse line. In 1970, a similar treaty was signed between West Germany and Poland. The final treaty was signed by
Poland and the unified Germany in 1990, and it was ratified by the Polish Sejm and the German Bundestag in 1991.
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would take over the Western Territories (see, e.g., Zaremba, 2012).18 Magdalena Grzebałkowska –
a journalist and author of “1945. War and Peace,” a book based on testimonies of descendants of
re-settlers to the Western Territories – was herself born in WT; her grandparents had been forced to
move from Kresy. In her book, she reflects on her own experiences growing up: “As a child, I was
worried that if something is postgerman, at some point it may become ‘postpolish.’ Unconsciously,
I inherited the fear of my ancestors-settlers that the place where I live is given to us just for a mo-
ment” (Grzebałkowska, 2015, p.72).19 In an interview with the authors of this paper (conducted on
May 9, 2018), Grzebałkowska confirmed that the experience of forced migration had an important
effect on the perception of uncertainty, which in turn is related to education decisions: “Unlike
migrants from Central Poland who always had an option of going back to Central Poland (and
some actually did go back),... forced Kresy migrants got the ‘one-way-ticket’ and lost everything...
when you lost everything, it seems worth investing in yourself, getting more education.”
There were no systematic studies of educational attainment of re-settlers in the Western Territo-
ries by ancestors’ origin before our paper. One important reason is that studies of forced migration
from Kresy were prohibited in socialist Poland. Nevertheless, the scattered evidence that is avail-
able underlines the focus on education – even among the first generation of Kresy migrants. For
example, the sociologist Irena Turnau assembled data on schooling in Wrocław (the former Ger-
man Breslau) in 1948. She found that children of Kresy migrants were over-represented among
secondary school students, and even more so among students in higher education.20
3 Data
We use numerous data sets for modern-day and historical Poland in our analysis. To capture
modern-day educational attainment at the individual level, we use two surveys that also ask ques-
tions about the history of migration of respondents’ ancestors in the aftermath of WWII.21 We
complement these surveys with aggregate (regional and county-level) data from historical census-
es that describe population characteristics in Poland before and after WWII. We describe each of
these data sources in turn.
18A popular saying illustrates how Kresy migrants perceived the ambiguous status of the Polish borders before the
1970s: “One atomic bomb, and we will again return to Lviv... A second one... we will be back to Vilnius.” (see, e.g.,
Zaremba, 2012).
19“Postgerman” (poniemieckie) is an actual word in Polish, which refers specifically to land and assets in the West-
ern Territories that were taken over by Poles from Germans after WWII.
20In Wrocław overall, 22% of the total population was born in Kresy. Among secondary school students, 27.5%
had roots in Kresy, and among students in higher education, 36.5% came from Kresy (numbers reported in Turnau,
1960, pp. 31-33). These numbers have to be interpreted with caution because they combine different surveys.
21In Appendix IV.4, we use a third survey, the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), which has a substantially smaller
sample than the other surveys, but nevertheless confirms our results.
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3.1 Diagnoza Survey
The Diagnoza (‘Social Diagnosis’) survey is a large-scale household survey comparable to similar
surveys in the US (PSID) or the UK (‘Understanding Society’). It is a representative sample of
the Polish population with 8 waves between 2000 and 2015.22 We commissioned the addition of
several questions to the 2015 wave, which inquired whether any of the ancestors of the respon-
dent came from Kresy and if so, from which exact location.23 The 2015 wave has almost 30,000
observations and allows us to compare education and other outcomes for respondents with any
ancestors from Kresy to those without ancestors from Kresy. Our primary interest is investment in
human capital. Thus, we focus on the education of respondents, using years of education as our
main variable of interest. We also use two dummies for educational attainment: i) for having (at
least) secondary education and ii) for (at least) completed higher (tertiary) education. We also use
a number of questions about the attitudes of respondents toward the education of their children and
toward the accumulation of material wealth. In addition, to measure the actual choices in accumu-
lation of physical wealth, we construct a variable that measures the share of physical assets that
respondents chose not to own, despite the fact that they could afford them.
A drawback of the Diagnoza Survey is that it only includes information on ancestors from
Kresy, but not for ancestors from other areas, such as from Central Poland. In addition, Diagnoza
does not report the exact ancestor who lived in Kresy (mother, father, grandmother, etc). Our
Ancestry Survey fills these gaps.
3.2 Ancestry Survey
In 2016, we conducted our own survey in the Western Territories, which had seen the largest inflow
of Kresy migrants after WWII. We asked a professional survey company to draw a representative
sample of the population in the Western Territories (3,169 respondents), as well as an additional
representative sample of people in WT with Kresy origin (900 respondents).24 We asked detailed
questions about the place of living of respondents’ ancestors for each ancestor in the generation
of the youngest adults in 1939 (see Appendix IV.5). For instance, if the youngest adult generation
was the respondent’s parents, we asked where the mother and the father of the respondent lived
22For further detail on the survey see http://diagnoza.com/index-en.html (accessed on September 24, 2018).
23The main question was “Is there anybody in your household who himself or his parents or grandparents were
living before WWII in the Eastern Borderlands (Kresy)?” If the answer was ‘yes,’ respondents were asked to indicate
up to three localities where their relatives lived in Kresy in the summer of 1939. We geocoded these places.
24This oversample of 900 additional respondents with Kresy origin was done via ‘random route’ sampling, i.e., after
interviewers had interviewed one of the randomly drawn 3,169 respondents, they would go from door to door in the
neighbourhood until they found a respondent with Kresy origins. Our baseline regressions are unweighted, following
the advice by Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2015) against the indiscriminate use of sample weights. However, our
Ancestry Survey results are very similar when using weights that account for the oversampling of respondents with
ancestors from Kresy (shown in Appendix IV.2).
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on September 1, 1939. If the generation of the youngest adults in the family in 1939 was the
respondent’s grandparents, we asked about the place of residence of each of the four grandparents.
Similarly, if the generation of the youngest adults in 1939 was the respondent’s great-grandparents,
we solicited information about place of living for all eight great-grandparents. Overall, the 4,069
respondents gave information about 13,223 ancestors. The vast majority of respondents knew the
exact name of the locality of origin of their ancestors (and not only the broad region of origin), even
when the generation of youngest adults in the family was the great-grandparents. This highlights
the importance of the mass population movements in the family histories of Poles.25 Overall, we
were able to identify and geo-code the place of residence of 11,928 out of 13,223 ancestors.
We report summary statistics for the Diagnoza Survey and for our Ancestry Survey in Tables
A.1 and A.2. Figure A.7 in the appendix displays the origin of ancestors in our Ancestry Survey.
3.3 Historical Censuses
Post-WWII Polish Census 1950 – The Polish Census in 1950 contains information on population
movements. It asked in which Polish region or in which country people lived before WWII (ac-
cording to post-WWII borders – thus, people who lived in Kresy in 1939 had to answer ‘USSR’).
In the Western Territories, this information is available by county (powiat) of residence; in Central
Poland, it is available by region (voivodeship) of residence, and for Kresy there is no further detail
(since all of Kresy falls under ‘USSR’).
Inter-War Polish Censuses: 1921 and 1931 – We use two censuses conducted in the Second
Polish Republic. The census closest to WWII was conducted in 1931; it gives information on lit-
eracy rates and shares of population with different languages and religions by locality, but without
cross-tabulations of the data. The 1921 Census, in contrast, has literacy rates by religious denomi-
nation, allowing us to measure the literacy rates among Roman Catholics. This is a close proxy for
the literacy of ethnic Poles because in the SPR, only Poles were Roman Catholics; other groups
had other religious affiliations, such as Orthodox Christians, Greek Catholics, and Jews.
Pre-WWI: Russian Empire Census 1897 – The 1897 Census of the Russian Empire (Troynitsky,
1899) provides information on literacy rates in the Russian language and in the native language
for each native language in the empire. For our purposes, we extract the literacy of native Polish
speakers in their native language.
Pre-WWI: German Empire Census 1900 – We use the share of Polish speakers in 1900 across
localities in the Western Territories to proxy for the autochthon population.
25In our survey, we were able to monitor the interview process, and we were impressed by how survey respondents
engaged with the questionnaire. Most respondents were fascinated by our questions about their ancestry to the extent
that they made every effort to respond accurately. Many checked family archives to make sure that they gave the most
precise answer possible. Some even called back to tell us their family stories.
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3.4 Benchmarking Survey Data against Historical Census Data
While we have no way to confirm the accuracy of ancestors’ location provided by individual re-
spondents, we can benchmark the survey responses against the information on post-WWII migra-
tion given by the 1950 Polish census. The latter provides both the pre-WWII location and the
location in 1950; these two pieces of information can be used to construct migration movements in
1939-50. We compare these with population movements implied by the survey responses – i.e., the
difference between respondent location in 2015/16 and the location of origin of their ancestors in
1939. We find that the ancestry information from the two surveys lines up well with the 1950 Cen-
sus data – despite the fact that the former includes post-1950 movements, while the latter does not.
Appendix III provides further detail and presents the graphs summarizing the data comparisons in
Figures A.8 and A.9.
4 Empirical Results: Forced Migration from Kresy and Education
Our analysis relates modern-day education outcomes to the place of origin of respondents’ ances-
tors. We use our two individual-level data sets – the Diagnoza Survey and our Ancestry Survey.
The advantage of Diagnoza is that it covers all of today’s Poland and has a large number of re-
spondents. On the downside, Diagnoza only includes information on whether respondents had any
ancestors from Kresy territories; it lacks information on how many ancestors were from Kresy,
as well as the origin of ancestors from regions other than Kresy. Our Ancestry Survey fills this
gap, by collecting information on all ancestors from the generation that was affected by the post-
WWII population transfers. One caveat is that the Ancestry Survey is run only in the Western
Territories (where most Kresy migrants resettled). This potentially raises concerns about selection
of voluntary migrants to WT. We discuss this in detail in Section 5. Overall, Diagnoza and our
Ancestry Survey can be seen as complements: The former allows us to compare descendants of
forced Kresy migrants to all other Poles, so that selection of the ‘control group’ is not an issue.
The latter includes more detailed information on ancestors by focusing on the area that saw the
largest inflow of migrants – Western Territories. The main results in both surveys are almost iden-
tical, suggesting that neither missing detail on non-Kresy ancestors in Diagnoza, nor selection of
voluntary migrants in the Ancestry Survey confound our results.
In both surveys, we estimate the following regression at the respondent level i:
Yi = β Kresyi + φ
′ Xi + ηLocality(i) + εi, (1)
where Yi denotes different outcomes of respondent i, such as measures of i’s education and atti-
tudes. In the Diagnoza Survey, Kresyi is a dummy variable that takes on value one if any ancestor
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was from Kresy. When using our own Ancestry Survey, we can also compute Kresyi as the share
of i’s ancestors from Kresy. Xi is a vector of the respondent’s demographics: gender; age and
age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies; as well as indicators for whether the respondent lives
in a rural area or in an urban county.26 Finally, ηLocality(i) represents fixed effects for the locality of
respondents’ residence. These absorb differences in the local socio-economic environment (such
as labor market conditions) and also whether respondents live in the Western Territories. In partic-
ular, we use fixed effects for counties (powiat) or municipalities (gmina). There are 377 counties
and 1,726 municipalities in the Diagnoza sample, and 115 counties and 407 municipalities in our
Ancestry Survey. In Diagnoza, we cluster the error term εi at the household level because several
respondents may come from the same household in this survey.27
4.1 Diagnoza Survey Results
Using the Diagnoza Survey, Table 2 shows that individuals whose ancestors were expelled from
Kresy territories have significantly higher levels of education today. Panel A presents our main
results for the commonly used outcome variable ‘years of education.’ In columns 1 and 2 we
examine the full sample, with approximately 28,300 respondents (out of whom more than 3,200
had Kresy ancestors). Column 1 reports results without any controls, showing that Kresy ancestry
is associated with 0.97 additional years of schooling (relative to an average of 11.91 years). When
we include county fixed effects and our set of baseline controls in column 2, the coefficient on
Kresy ancestry remains similar and highly significant (0.82 extra years of schooling). This suggests
that our results are not affected by spatial sorting of migrants, or by local characteristics such as
labor markets or land quality. In what follows, we refer to column 2 (i.e., including county fixed
effects) as our baseline specification. Column 3 shows that results are also very similar when we
control for the particularly restrictive municipality fixed effects. Thus, even when comparing Poles
who live in the same town or city today, those with Kresy ancestors have a substantial education
advantage. This result also suggests that local unobservables do not confound our results. Next,
columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to respondents in rural and urban areas, respectively. The
coefficient on Kresy is somewhat larger in urban areas (where the average educational attainment
is also higher). In addition, the results are broadly similar for respondents in Central Poland and
the Western Territories (columns 6 and 7). In other words, the descendants of forced migrants from
Kresy enjoy an educational advantage everywhere in Poland.
26Note that by using the interactions of birth-decade dummies with age and with age2, we allow for non-linear
effects of age within each age group.
27We exclude all respondents in Diagnoza who are younger than 16 years old – the age of completing secondary
education. In our Ancestry Survey, all respondents are adults. All our results hold in more restrictive specifications
that exclude respondents with ‘student’ status.
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In Panels B and C of Table 2 the dependent variable is an indicator for secondary and higher
education, respectively. In our baseline specifications in column 2 we find that descendants of
Kresy migrants are 11.2 percentage points more likely to finish secondary education (relative to a
mean of 50%), and 8.8 percentage points more likely to graduate from college (relative to a mean
of 20%). Thus, in relative terms, the association between Kresy origin and education is strongest
for higher education.28
Additional results in the Diagnoza Survey: Cohorts and labor market outcomes
Figure 3 plots the coefficient on Kresy for different birth cohorts. We begin with the oldest cohort
in the Diagnoza Survey – those born before 1930. If anything, Kresy migrants in the pre-1930
cohort have somewhat lower education than other Poles. This echoes the 1921 census data shown
in Figure 2 above. The pre-1930 cohort was 16 or older in 1945 and thus would already have
finished their secondary education (if they had any). In addition, within this cohort, respondents
with Kresy ancestors are likely to be Kresy migrants themselves. Thus, the results for the oldest
cohort in the Diagnoza Survey help us to address the concern that Kresy migrants may have had
higher education already when they were displaced (either due to pre-existing differences or due
to selection). Next, among the 1930 birth cohort (i.e., school-age children in 1945), respondents
with Kresy origin have about 1.3 extra years of schooling.29 For later birth cohorts, the coefficient
on Kresy declines somewhat but remains highly statistically significant. This makes sense in the
context of our hypothesis that forced migration led to a shift in preferences towards education: The
intergenerational transmission of preferences is not one-to-one, even when taking into account
local peer effects and assortative mating of parents (c.f. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde,
2012).30 Table A.3 in the appendix presents regressions by birth cohorts and shows that results are
28To benchmark these estimates, we compare them to the effect of well-known interventions. In the US context,
quasi-experimental evidence on federal financial aid by Dynarski (2003) shows that an additional $2000 in aid in-
creased college attendance by about eight percentage points. Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2012)
find very similar effects of a “combined assistance and information treatment” for Federal Student Aid among low-
income families. High-school seniors whose parents received this treatment were eight percentage points more likely
to attend and continue college over the subsequent three years. Our estimates for the Kresy effect are very similar in
size.
29Historical accounts suggests that the supply of schools was well organized as early as 1946, even in the Western
Territories. There was a great effort to ensure good educational opportunities (free and obligatory for the primary
schools). The first schools in WT were established relying on the initiative of individual teachers. Very quickly,
however, the communist authorities created special institutions to develop a unified educational system in WT and in
CP (Online PWN Encyclopedia, accessed 28 March 2018).
30Note that the coefficients cannot be directly compared because the mean differs across cohorts. Figure A.10 in the
appendix reports coefficients where ln(years of education) is the dependent variable (i.e., semi-elasticities that can be
directly compared across cohorts). The pattern is very similar to Figure 3. Note also that among the 1990s birth cohort,
many respondents were still in school/university by the time of the Diagnoza Survey in 2015. In the last column in
Figure 3 we exclude students. If, in contrast, we include students the coefficient on Kresy for the youngest cohort
declines to 2.6% but remains statistically highly significant.
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similar for secondary and higher education.
In Table A.4 in the appendix we show that higher education due to forced migration translates
into better labor market outcomes. We find that respondents with ancestors from Kresy earn higher
income, are more likely to work in white-collar occupations and are less likely to be unemployed.
4.2 Ancestry Survey Results
We now turn to our Ancestry Survey, which has information on the origin of all ancestors in a
respondent’s family tree, for the generation of the youngest adults at the beginning of WWII. We
use this information to compare the descendants of forced migrants from Kresy with descendants
of voluntary migrants from Central Poland, and with autochthons. Compared to Diagnoza (which
covered all of Poland), a limitation of the Ancestry Survey is that it only includes respondents
who live in the Western Territories – where most migrants from Kresy were transferred to. This
potentially raises concerns about selection of other people who voluntarily migrated to WT (i.e.,
the ‘control group’ in our regressions). We conduct various analyses to show that such selection
is unlikely to confound our results. Before moving to these checks and the interpretation of our
results in Section 6, we show that our main results also hold in the Ancestry Survey.
Respondent-Level Analysis in the Ancestry Survey
We use the detailed information on ancestor origins in our Ancestry Survey to compute, for each
respondent, the share of ancestors from Kresy, as well as from Central Poland, autochthons from
the Western Territories, and from abroad (see summary statistics in Table A.2). Columns 1 and 2
in Table 3 (Panel A) present the simplest specification in the Ancestry Survey, using a dummy for
“any respondent from Kresy,” thus replicating the specification from the Diagnoza Survey. The
coefficients are very similar to the first two columns of Table 2. Next, column 3 uses the share of
ancestors from Kresy as the main explanatory variable in equation (1). This coefficient reflects the
change in education outcomes when moving from zero to one in the share of ancestors from Kresy.
The magnitude is similar to the results in columns 1 and 2, where we used a dummy for any ances-
tor from Kresy.31 In column 3 we also control for the share of ancestors from WT (autochthons)
and of Poles who lived abroad in 1939 as controls. Note that the share of ancestors from Cen-
tral Poland is thus the reference group. In addition, we control for the share of each respondent’s
31Note that in column 3 the comparison group is Poles with ancestors from Central Poland (since we control for the
share of ancestors from WT and abroad), while in column 2, the comparison group is ancestors from all of Poland.
When running the same specification as in column 2 (i.e., without controlling for other ancestor shares), the coefficient
on share Kresy is 0.917, which is almost identical to the indicator for any ancestor from Kresy in column 2. We provide
an explanation for the similarity of these coefficients in Appendix IV.2: We show that having a majority of ancestors
from Kresy does not have a differential effect on descendants’ education above and beyond having any ancestor from
Kresy (Table A.6). This result suggests that Kresy ancestry is salient within families. That is, in families with mixed
ancestor origins, those from Kresy may dominate the transmission of values related to education.
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ancestors who came from rural origin locations to capture possible differences between migrants
from rural and urban areas. The negative coefficient on the share of ancestors from WT shows
that autochthons have lower education levels as compared to the control group – descendants of
migrants from Central Poland. Overall, the ranking of respondents in terms of education by the
origin of ancestors from highest to lowest is thus: Kresy, Central Poland, Western Territories –
or forced migrants, voluntary migrants, autochthons. Column 4 shows that our results are very
similar when we include fixed effects for municipalities (gminy), which are typically smaller than
local labor markets. This suggests that local socio-economic characteristics do not confound our
results. In columns 5 and 6 we find that our results are remarkably similar for rural and urban
destinations of migrants – in line with the Diagnoza results from Table 2. Finally, columns 7 and
8 show that the share of Kresy ancestors is also significantly related to the probability of finishing
secondary and higher education.
Ancestor-Level Analysis in the Ancestry Survey
In the analysis above, we used our Ancestry Survey at the respondent level. We now turn to the data
at the ancestor level, where each ancestor a of each respondent i is a separate observation. This
allows us to control for characteristics of individual ancestors, and to exploit the origin location of
ancestors around the Kresy border. We estimate the following equation:
Yi = γKresya(i) + ψ
′Aa(i) + ϕ
′Oa(i) + φ
′Xi + ηLocality(i) + εa(i) , (2)
where Yi is respondent i’s education, as above, and Kresya(i) indicates whether ancestor a of re-
spondent i came from Kresy. In addition to all standard controls for respondents’ demographics
(Xi) and destination location fixed effects ηLocality(i) , we control for ancestor characteristicsAa(i):
dummies for whether ancestor a is a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent of respondent i.32
Oa(i) denotes characteristics at the origin location of ancestor a, such as whether a came from a
rural area. We also include dummies indicating whether the ancestor was an autochthon or came
from abroad, which leaves origin from Central Poland as the comparison group. We cluster error
terms by respondents to account for the fact that all ancestry information for a given respondent
comes from the same source, and that education of the respondent does not vary across ances-
tors.33 Panel B of Table 3 presents results at the ancestor level. Throughout, we find positive and
32Among all ancestors in our sample, 23% were the parents; 55% were the grandparents; and 22% were the great-
grandparents.
33It is important to note that, econometrically, respondent-level and ancestor-level regressions are not equivalent.
In Appendix IV.3 we present Monte Carlo simulations comparing the results of ancestor-level and respondent-level
regressions. First, we show that the point estimate of the parameter of interest in the ancestor-level regression, γ, is
smaller than the point estimate of the parameter of interest in respondent-level regressions, β from equation (1). The
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significant coefficients on the indicator for ancestors from Kresy.
4.3 Identification: Kresy Border Samples
So far, we have presented correlations between Kresy ancestry and education. The higher educa-
tional attainment of Kresy descendants could be driven by pre-existing differences in the Eastern
territories. For example, attitudes towards education may have been different in Kresy vs. Central
Poland before WWII – even if literacy rates were very similar (see Figure 2). In what follows, we
exploit the discontinuity around the Kresy border to identify causal effects of forced migration.34
Kresy Border Sample based on the Diagnoza Survey
We begin with the Diagnoza Survey, restricting the sample to an area of less than 150 km on each
side of the border between Kresy and Central Poland. This arguably provides a culturally more
homogenous area. At the same time, we face a challenge in constructing this sample. Because
people from Kresy were expelled, there are no Diagnoza respondents living on the Eastern side of
the border today. We thus use information on the location of ancestors that is provided in Diagnoza
to identify respondents with ancestors within less than 150 km to the east of the Kresy border.35
As for the area within 150 km to the west of the Kresy border (i.e., in today’s Poland), we assume
that respondents without Kresy ancestors who live there today have also family roots in the area.
We discuss the limitations of this assumption below.
We first check whether there were pre-existing differences in education between the two sides
of the Kresy border. The left panel of Figure 4 shows that this is not the case: Literacy among
Poles (identified by their Roman Catholic religion in the 1921 census) was very similar to the east
and west of the Kresy border. There is also no significant trend in distance on either side of the
border. In contrast, the right panel of Figure 4 shows that there is a sharp discontinuity at the
border, with today’s education jumping by about one year. This confirms that Kresy descendants
have substantially higher education levels, even among a subset of individuals with ancestors from
locations close to the Kresy border. Table A.10 in the appendix complements Figure 4, presenting
spatial RDD results for the Diagnoza border sample.
relationship between the two parameters depends on the correlation between indicator variables for Kresy origin of
different ancestors of the same respondent. Second, we show that the level of significance in the respondent-level and
the ancestor-level regressions is similar irrespective of the correlation among ancestor origins of the same respondent,
as long as this correlation is positive (as is the case in our data). In other words, statistical inference in both types of
regressions is the same.
34In Appendix V (Figures A.11 and A.12) we show that there are no jumps at the Kresy border in geo-climatic
characteristics or agricultural suitability. This complements the historical discussion on the arbitrariness of the Kresy
border in Section 2.1.
35Whenever a respondent in Diagnoza gave the location of more than one Kresy ancestor (see footnote 23), we
make a conservative choice – using the maximum distance to the Kresy border among all ancestors.
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The Diagnoza border sample analysis has an important shortcoming: Individuals with Kresy
roots now largely live in the Western Territories, far away from the historical Kresy border. Our
border analysis compares them to individuals who still live close to the Kresy border today (to
its west). That is, we compare respondents who live far apart today, rather than within the same
location. Correspondingly, the border analysis with Diagnoza data does not include respondent
location fixed effects, since these would absorb the relevant variation. Next, we address this limi-
tation, using the more detailed data from our Ancestry Survey.
Border Sample based on the Ancestry Survey
Our Ancestry Survey allows us to perform a particularly restrictive border sample analysis. The
Ancestry Survey includes information on ancestors from both sides of the Kresy border (see Figure
A.13 in the appendix). This enables us to compare people who live in the same town or village in
WT today, but have ancestors from the different sides of the Kresy border.
Figure 5 illustrates the border effect for years of education. As above, we restrict the sample
to people with ancestor origin within less than 150 kilometers of the Kresy border. However, in
contrast to the Diagnoza analysis presented above, we include fixed effects for the current munic-
ipality of respondents in addition to our standard controls. When comparing people who live in
the same municipality in the Western Territories today, those whose ancestors were expelled from
just a few kilometers to the east of the Kresy border have significantly higher education than those
whose ancestors lived a few kilometers to the west of the Kresy border. Table A.11 in the appendix
provides the corresponding spatial RDD results as well as robustness checks.
A limitation of the border analysis in our Ancestry Survey is that migrants from the west of
the Kresy border (i.e., from Central Poland) may have been selected. To address this concern, the
two border analyses from Diagnoza and our Ancestry Survey serve as complements: They show
that the descendants of forced migrants from the east of the Kresy border are more educated than
both ‘stayers’ in the area west of the Kresy border (Figure 4) and ‘movers,’ i.e., the descendants
of (voluntary) migrants who left this area (Figure 5). The magnitude of the Kresy coefficients
is also very similar in both analyses (see Tables A.10 and A.11). Thus, in combination, the two
border samples suggest that selection of voluntary migrants is unlikely to confound our results.
Nevertheless, we further discuss the possibility of selected voluntary migrants in Section 5 below.
Contested Border Sample based on Ancestry Survey
We discussed in Section 2.1 that the Kresy border was arguably drawn at random, without taking
local conditions into account. We address possible skepticism about this issue by exploiting the fact
that the location of the Kresy border was debated, with seven different versions being discussed
at the Tehran Conference in 1943. In Appendix V.4, we further restrict the border sample to areas
21
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173648 
that were contested during the negotiations about the Curzon line. In this analysis, we only use
ancestors who lived in an area that could either have become part of Poland or of the Soviet Union,
depending on the variant of the Curzon line. Even within this highly restrictive subsample we find
a statistically significant effect, with Kresy ancestry implying 0.94 extra years of schooling.
5 Threats to Identification: Pre-Existing Differences and Selection
This section discusses potential threats to our identification of an effect of forced migration on
education. We discuss pre-existing differences between Kresy vs. the rest of Poland as well as
selection of migrants.
5.1 Pre-Existing Differences?
Could our results be driven by differences of Poles from Kresy before forced migration took place?
Possible examples include pre-existing differences in education, in preferences for schooling, and
in socio-economic or geographic characteristics. We show that these are unlikely to affect our
findings.
Were Poles in Kresy territories already more educated before WWII?
An obvious concern is that Poles who were expelled from Kresy may already have been more
educated before WWII. We have presented evidence that makes this unlikely. Figure 2 shows
that in 1921, Roman Catholics (i.e., Poles) in Kresy had a literacy rate of 58.9%, as compared
to 65.4% in Central Poland. This pattern also holds when we differentiate between rural areas
(Kresy: 55.4%; CP: 63.2%) and urban areas (Kresy: 73.6%; CP: 74.1%). Thus, if anything, Poles
from Kresy were less educated on average before they were forced to migrate, compared to Poles
in the rest of the Second Polish Republic. This is also confirmed by our cohort analysis in Figure 3
(slightly lower education for Kresy origin in the pre-1930s birth cohort) and in the border sample
in Figure 4 (left panel).
Did Poles in Kresy already have higher preferences for education before WWII?
Pre-existing differences in preferences for education are unlikely to drive our results. As discussed
in Section 2.1, there were no differences in access to education in Kresy vs. CP before WWII
(all belonged to Poland then), and there was also no discrimination of Poles in Kresy. Thus, if
Poles from Kresy had had pre-existing preferences for education, these should have materialized
in higher literacy rates before WWII. If anything, the contrary is true, as we have shown above. In
addition, since the Kresy border was arbitrary (see Section 2.1 and Appendix V), it is unlikely that
pre-existing cultural differences would jump at the border. Consequently, our border samples in
Figures 4 and 5 help to address possible unobserved differences that may have affected education
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decisions.36
Socio-Economic and Geographic Characteristics
To what extent do characteristics of migrants’ origin locations affect the relationship between
Kresy origin and education? To analyze this, we use our Ancestry Survey and augment speci-
fication (2) by adding a host of socio-economic and geographic controls (all measured at ancestor
origin locations), as well as their interaction with the Kresy origin dummy. Specifically, using the
1931 Polish Census, we interact Kresy origin with the share of Roman Catholics, the shares of
native Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian speakers, the literacy rate, and the urbanization rate. We
also use the share of literate Roman Catholics from the Polish Census of 1921. Going beyond
the population characteristics, we look at climate variables at the place of origin. A large share
of the population was working in agriculture pre-1939. Thus, land suitability, temperature, the
precipitation-evatranspiration ratio, and ruggedness were key features of the economic environ-
ment. Tables A.13 and A.14 in the appendix show that neither the variables in levels nor their
interaction terms with Kresy origin are statistically significant. In addition, the coefficients (all
based on standardized variables) are typically an order of magnitude smaller than the coefficient
on Kresy origin, while the latter maintains its magnitude and significance from our baseline ances-
tor regressions in Panel B of Table 3. We interpret this as evidence that the effect of uprootedness
is driven by forced migration itself, and not by specific circumstances at the place of origin.37
Differential War Exposure or Victimization?
Could differential WWII experience of ancestors from Kresy be an alternative explanation for our
findings? Since there are no comparable administrative data from Polish or Soviet sources, we
draw on survey data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), which asked respondents in 2016
whether anybody in the respondent’s family was killed or injured as a result of WWII. In Appendix
VI.2 we show that while Kresy ancestors are more likely to have experienced injuries or death, a
family history of victimization in WWII is not associated with education of descendants, and the
coefficient on Kresy origin is not affected by controlling for WWII victimization.
36Another factor that potentially could confound our results is the difference in the way imperial powers treated
Poles during the Partitions of Poland before 1918 (see Section 2.1). To address this, we use the historical fact that
within the Partitions, Poles were treated equally no matter if they lived in Kresy or Central Poland. In Appendix VI.4,
we replicate our main result in a sub-sample of respondents whose ancestors came from the Russian Partition (see
odd columns in Panel B of Table A.17). The Russian Partition covered about three quarters of Kresy and one half of
Central Poland.
37Among the interaction results, the following are worth highlighting: Columns 1-5 of Table A.13 show that our
main result is not affected by the share of Poles (measured either as Roman Catholics or Polish speakers), Ukrainians,
or Russians at the ancestors’ origin locations. Moreover, the interaction between Kresy and each of these shares
is small, negative, and insignificant. This suggests that Kresy being a multi-ethnicity area, or a possible animosity
between Poles and other ethnicities, does not affect our results.
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5.2 Selection of Migrants from Kresy?
Could selection of forced migrants from Kresy drive our results? We discuss the possibilities of
selection at the origin and selection into destinations.
Were forced migrants from Kresy selected at the origin?
Selection at the origin is highly unlikely among Kresy migrants, as it contradicts the historical
narrative of large-scale efforts to expel Poles from Kresy. However, some historical sources do
suggest that forced migration out of Kresy was not fully homogenous (see Section 2.2). In par-
ticular, the pressure on Poles to leave was lower in rural areas in the Belorussian and Lithuanian
parts of Kresy. In Ukraine, in contrast, strong animosity between Poles and Ukrainians at the end
of WWII led to an (almost) complete exodus of Poles from both urban and rural areas. In what
follows, we explore this variation by first restricting the sample to urban areas in Kresy, and then
to the Ukrainian part of Kresy (our Ancestry Survey provides the detailed location of origin for
each ancestor, both in terms of rural vs. urban origin and the county of origin).
If selection of Poles from Kresy affects our results, the coefficient on Kresy origin should vary
depending on how much scope for selection a given ancestor’s region of origin offered. Table 4
tests whether this is the case using our main outcome variable – years of education. We create dif-
ferent subsamples depending on ancestors’ locations of origin. Regressions are run at the ancestor
level as outlined by equation (2). Column 1 replicates our main result using all Kresy ancestors
(Table 3, Panel B, column 3): Descendants of Kresy migrants have significantly higher education
today. In columns 2 and 3 we present results for ancestors from urban and rural origin locations,
respectively. The point estimates are slightly higher for the urban origin sample than for the rural
origin sample. In other words, our results are stronger for locations from which the expulsion of
Poles was nearly universal. One potential concern is that the estimate in the urban origin sample
(column 2) could be inflated if more educated urban migrants from Kresy were displaced to rural
areas in WT – according to the 1921 Census, literacy rates among Roman Catholics in Kresy were
73.4% in urban areas and 55.4% in rural areas. If these (former) city dwellers passed on their taste
for education, we would compare their well-educated descendants to the less educated rural popu-
lation in WT. We address this possibility in column 4, restricting the sample to those cases in which
both ancestors and descendants are from urban areas. The effect of Kresy is almost unchanged.
In columns 5-8 in Table 4 we restrict the sample to ancestors from the Ukrainian part of Kresy,
where expulsions were universal. The coefficient in column 5 (for both urban and rural origin
locations) is very similar to the one when using all Kresy regions (column 1). In addition, columns
6 and 7 show a similar pattern as columns 2 and 3: Coefficients are highly significant for both rural
and urban ancestors, and they are somewhat larger in the urban origin subsample. Finally, results
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hold when restricting the subsample to ancestors from urban areas in Ukraine whose descendants
also live in urban areas today (column 8). In sum, the results shown in Table 4 render it unlikely
that selection of Kresy migrants at the origin drives our findings.
Selection of forced Kresy migrants into destinations?
Even if selection from origin locations in Kresy is unlikely, there may have been selection of
Kresy migrants or their descendants into destinations. As Table 1 has shown, while the majority of
Kresy migrants settled in the Western Territories, about one quarter moved to Central Poland. For
example, if the most capable Kresy migrants moved to the Western Territories, our results within
WT would be biased. In addressing this concern, we begin by noting that the results from Table 2
(columns 6 and 7) show that the coefficients on Kresy ancestry are, if anything, larger in CP than
in WT. Next, we present an additional check: We restrict the Diagnoza sample to respondents with
Kresy origin. Within this subsample, we can compare the level of education of those who live
in CP (overall 1,268 respondents) with those who live in WT (1,930 respondents). Table A.16 in
the appendix shows that respondents with Kresy origin are somewhat less educated in the Western
Territories than in Central Poland.38 Overall, these results suggest that selection of Kresy migrants
into different areas of Poland is not driving our results.
5.3 Selection of Voluntary Migrants?
In our results for Poland overall (i.e., using the Diagnoza Survey), selection of the control group
(i.e., voluntary migrants) is not an issue – the control group comprises ‘all other Poles.’ However,
our Ancestry Survey was conducted only in the Western Territories, which was not only the des-
tination of forced migrants from Kresy, but also of voluntary migrants from Central Poland. This
raises the potential issue of selection of voluntary migrants. In particular, our Ancestry Survey
coefficients on Kresy origin would be biased upward if the control group of less educated individ-
uals was more likely to migrate from CP to WT after WWII. We perform several analyses to show
that this is unlikely to confound our findings. We differentiate between regional and individual
selection of the control group, briefly presenting the methodology and results in the main text,
supported by further detail and tables in the appendix.
Regional selection of voluntary migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories?
We first examine the possibility of regional selection – migrants from Central Poland coming from
areas with historically lower education. For each respondent in our Ancestry Survey, we know the
place of origin of each of their ancestors; and from the historical censuses, we know the literacy
38The reason for this difference is probably more recent migration of highly skilled individuals with Kresy back-
ground to large urban centers such as Warsaw and Cracow in Central Poland. People with Kresy origin have a
particularly high education advantage in these areas (see Table A.16).
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rates at the counties of their origin. This allows us to compare the historical literacy rates in the
counties of origin of ancestors from Kresy and from Central Poland. We perform this exercise in
Appendix VI.4 and find that Kresy ancestors came on average from counties with a 3 percentage
point lower literacy rate (see results shown in Table A.17). Thus, Kresy ancestors actually came
from counties with slightly lower pre-WWII literacy, confirming the aggregate pattern shown in
Figure 2.
Individual selection of voluntary migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories?
While we have shown that regional (county-level) selection is unlikely to affect our results, individ-
ual selection of voluntary migrants remains a possibility. In particular, it could potentially be the
case that uneducated Poles from Central Poland decided to seek a better fortune in the Western Ter-
ritories, whereas educated Poles from the same origin counties stayed in Central Poland. Negative
selection of Central Polish migrants into WT would imply that the control group in our Ancestry
Survey has too low education, biasing the coefficient on Kresy origin upward. To examine directly
whether there was negative individual selection, we would need historical individual-level data
on the education of voluntary migrants and stayers in Central Poland. These are not available.
However, we can check whether the (potential) selection concern matters for our results: If one
were worried about negative selection of migrants from CP, then this would be in the context of
persistent lower education of their descendants today (i.e., of our control group). Building on this
argument, we can use contemporaneous education to show that individual selection is unlikely
to affect our results. In Table A.18 in Appendix VI.5 we show that respondents in WT with an-
cestors from Central Poland (i.e., voluntary migrants) are actually slightly more educated than a
reasonable comparison group – today’s respondents in those counties in CP where the voluntary
migrants’ ancestors originated from. In other words, descendants of voluntary migrants who live
in WT today are somewhat more educated than their ‘cousins’ whose (grand)parents stayed in CP.
Thus, if anything, our Ancestry Survey results tend to underestimate the effect for Kresy origin in
WT. Overall, we find no indication that pre-existing differences or selection of migrants drive our
results.
6 Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss several potential mechanisms that may drive the education premium of
descendants of forced migrants from Kresy. We begin by showing evidence in favor of the most
likely mechanism – a shift in preferences towards investment in education as opposed to physical
capital (‘uprootedness hypothesis’ for short). We then continue by discussing alternative possible
mechanisms such as congested labor markets, differential out-migration, fertility, recall bias, or
26
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173648 
returns to schooling. None of these appear to play an important role. The table at the end of the
appendix summarizes our findings for each (potential) mechanism, with references to tables and
sections in the text.
6.1 Preferences for Education vs. Ownership of Physical Assets
In Table 5, we examine attitudes toward education and material possessions. In the first two
columns, we use a question from Diagnoza about respondents’ aspiration for the education of their
children. The outcome variable is an indicator that takes the value of one for respondents with the
highest aspiration.39 People with Kresy ancestors score 8 percentage points higher, relative to a
mean of 59%. Remarkably, this result remains very similar even after we control for the respon-
dent’s own education (column 2). Namely, among people with the same years of schooling (who
also live in the same county), those with Kresy ancestors have significantly stronger preferences
for the education of their children.40
In columns 3-6 of Table 5 we examine answers to the question: “What is the main condition
for success in life?” We construct dummies for two categories: “possession of material goods”
and “freedom.”41 Columns 3 and 4 show that respondents with Kresy ancestors are significantly
less likely to believe that material goods determine a successful life; and columns 5 and 6 show
that descendants of Kresy migrants value freedom more than the rest of the Polish population. In
columns 7 and 8, we explore whether the lower value placed on material wealth among descendants
of Kresy migrants translates into actual choices about accumulating assets. Diagnoza asks about
the possession of 20 different assets (e.g., house, apartment, vacation home, garden land plot,
ebook reader, home theatre, boat, etc.). For those assets not possessed, respondents were asked
if this was for financial reasons. The dependent variable in columns 7-8 is the number of assets
not owned for non-financial reasons (i.e., assets that the household could afford, but chooses not
to purchase), divided by the number of all non-possessed assets.42 Consistent with the results on
39The survey question was: ‘What level of education would you like your children to attain?’ The answer included
five categories, and we create a dummy for the highest category. Results are robust to using the full categorical variable
instead of the dummy for the highest score. Note that the sample is smaller because this question is not answered when
children have already finished their education.
40We elaborate on this finding by performing a Sobel-Goodman mediation test. This analysis (not reported in the
table) examines the extent to which a mediating variable (respondents’ own education) carries the influence of an
explanatory variable (Kresy ancestors) to a dependent variable (aspiration for education of children). We find that
only 16% of the effect of Kresy ancestry on “high aspiration” are mediated by own education. The remaining 84%
constitute a “direct effect,” i.e., independent of a respondent’s own education. This finding suggests that our results are
predominantly driven by a change in preferences towards education among people with Kresy ancestors, as opposed
to a mechanism whereby educated parents have educated children.
41For each category, the dummy indicates the answers: “definitely yes,” “yes,” or “rather yes.” The dummy equals
zero for the answers “neither yes nor no,” “rather no,” “no,” and “definitely no.”
42Note that, unsurprisingly, Kresy migrants on average own a larger number of assets, as they earn higher incomes
due to their higher levels of education. Controlling for the overall number of assets owned by each household does not
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stated preferences from columns 3 and 4, we find that Kresy migrants own fewer assets, relative
to what they could afford. In sum, the results in Table 5 lend support to the interpretation that
forced migration shifted preferences towards investment in education, and away from material
possessions.43
6.2 Other Potential Channels
In what follows, we examine whether our findings may be affected by different local characteristics
or different behavior of Kresy migrants after migrants arrived at their destinations. Appendix VII.2
provides additional detail.
Congestion
The previous literature (as discussed in the introduction) showed that migrants who lack access
to local land resources (which are held by entrenched locals) often opt for education in order to
get access to non-agricultural jobs. This is unlikely to affect our results for several reasons. First,
the Western Territories were largely empty after WWII, and the idea of the resettlement was to
populate this ‘empty space.’ Second, as we described in Section 2.2, migrants from Kresy and CP
arrived to WT at the same time (see Figure A.6 in the appendix). Third, if local congestion drove
up the incentives to invest in education, this would be captured by county or municipality fixed
effects. Thus, a differential congestion effect for Kresy and CP migrants is a priori unlikely.
While destination fixed effects in our previous regressions capture any direct effect of conges-
tion on education, it is still possible that congestion affected Kresy migrants differentially. We test
for this channel by using interactions between Kresy ancestry and the population of autochthons in
the respondent’s county of residence. Autochthons were a minority in WT, but their share varied
across localities. We use the share of autochthons in 1950 from the Polish Census.44
Column 1 in Table 6 reports the results using data from Diagnoza, adding an interaction term
between the Kresy origin of respondents and the county-level autochthon share to specification
(1). We find that the interaction effect between Kresy origin and the historical presence of au-
tochthons is relatively small and insignificant. To facilitate the interpretation of coefficient sizes,
we standardized the share of autochthons. The interaction coefficient implies that a one standard
change our results.
43 The shift in preferences in Table 5 could be founded on a number of underlying reasons: a shift in the subjective
probability individuals attach to being forced to migrate in the future; an increase in the subjective probability that bad
things may happen, so that education serves as insurance; a shift in the willingness to take risks; a shift in discount
rates; and a shift in the valuation of education per se. We discuss those in Appendix VII.1.
44The share of autochthons in 1950 in the median county was 6.5%, and the mean, 15%. Figure A.15 in the appendix
shows that this measure is highly correlated with the share of Polish speakers in 1900 in the German Empire Census.
The share of autochthons shows ample variation, with some counties having more than 90% autochthons, while others
had close to zero.
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deviation higher share of autochthons is only associated with 0.14 extra years of schooling among
people with Kresy ancestors (relative to a direct Kresy coefficient of 0.73). These results suggest
that differential congestion effects for Kresy migrants are unlikely to drive our findings.
Returns to schooling
Could our results be driven by differential returns to schooling for Kresy migrants? We shed
light on this question in columns 2 and 3 in Table 6. We use log household income as dependent
variable and are interested in the interaction term between Kresy origin and years of education. A
significantly positive coefficient would imply higher returns to schooling for Kresy migrants. We
find that the interaction term is small and insignificant in both the full Diagnoza sample and in the
subsample of the Western Territories.45 This suggests that differential returns to schooling do not
affect our results.
Out-migration
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 6 examine whether differential migration from Poland to other countries
(after Poland’s EU accession in 2004) may affect our results. For example, if uneducated people
with Kresy origin (or educated people without Kresy origin) were more likely to leave Poland, then
this could bias the coefficient on Kresy upwards.46 We use the fact that the Diagnoza Survey asked
respondents whether they “plan to go abroad within the next two years, in order to work?” We find
no relationship between Kresy ancestry and the intent to emigrate (column 4). The interaction term
between education and Kresy origin is also small and insignificant (column 5). If the respondents
who intend to emigrate have similar characteristics as those who had left already, these results make
it unlikely that education and Kresy origin drove emigration in a fashion that would confound our
results. As we do not observe directly the people who emigrated, we provide indirect evidence
in support of this underlying assumption. The Polish Census in 2011 included a question: “How
many members of your household have emigrated?” The response to this question is publicly
available at the regional level. In Figure A.16 in the appendix we show that there is a strong positive
relationship between the actual out-migration and the intent to emigrate reported in Diagnoza. This
validates our use of the latter as a proxy for emigration from Poland.
45The coefficient on Kresy itself becomes smaller when we control for years of education, suggesting that the effect
of Kresy origin on income works via education.
46However, emigration from Poland was very small before its accession to the EU. The share of people leaving
Poland did not exceed 0.15% in any decade of the second half of the 20th century: 1951-1960: 0.14%; 1961-1970:
0.07%; 1971-1973: 0.06%; 1975-1980: 0.07%; 1981-1990: 0.07%; 1991-1998: 0.06% (numbers from Gawryszewski,
2005, pp. 472-473).
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Differential fertility
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 6 study the possibility that differential fertility may confound our re-
sults. For example, Kresy migrants may have chosen lower fertility to remain more flexible in an
environment that they perceived as highly volatile (see Section 2.3). Fewer offspring could then
have enabled higher investment in each child’s human capital. Over time, this may have translated
into stronger preferences for education. We find that Kresy origin is uncorrelated with the number
of children per household member, which is the closest proxy for measuring fertility in our data.
While this does not exclude the possibility that differential fertility played a role initially, it makes
it unlikely that this channel is at play for the younger generations in our data. In addition, note that
in the differential-fertility interpretation, preferences for education would develop later on, with
lower fertility being the initial driver. In contrast, the historical evidence discussed in Section 2.3
suggests that preferences shifted immediately, as a direct result of uprootedness.
Economic Development at Destination Locations
The ex-German territories were more developed than Kresy before WWII. Could our results be
driven simply by a move to a place with more developed infrastructure? Economic opportunities
were open to both forced and voluntary migrants, so that they should be captured by location fixed
effects. In addition, we observe a very similar Kresy effect among respondents in Central Poland,
which was relatively poor (see Table 2, columns 6 and 7). This renders it unlikely that economic
development at the destination confounds our results. Nevertheless, we provide further checks in
Appendix VII.2, using three measures of economic development: 1) the density of railways in
1946 (at the county level), 2) log industrial production per capita in 1954 (at the regional level),
and 3) the intensity of war-time destruction, separately in rural and urban areas in 1945 (at the
county level). Using these measures, Table A.22 shows that while education is strongly associated
with measures of development in WT on average, the effect of Kresy origin on education does not
depend on the level of development – the interaction term in columns 2-5 is small and insignificant
for all measures of economic development, with the exception of railway density (which is driven
by one county: Warsaw). This makes it unlikely that economic conditions at the destination of
migrants confound our results.
Moving as Communities and Other Population Movements
Another potential confounding factor is that Kresy migrants might be more likely to have moved in
groups from the same location of origin. If moving in groups was beneficial to their descendants’
education, this may have reinforced the education effect. While we do not have census-type data
on the number of migrants in a destination who are from the same origin, our Ancestry Survey
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allows us to generate a proxy for migrants moving as whole communities (which we describe
in Appendix VII.2). Table A.23 in the appendix shows that controlling for whether ancestors
moved as a community does not affect our main results. On two other issues related to population
movements, Table A.24 shows that our results are not affected i) by the share of Ukrainian and
Belorussian minority groups that were expelled from Poland to the USSR in 1945-46 or ii) by
the “second repatriation” of Poles from the USSR in 1955-59 (which made up only about 10% of
overall migration from Kresy).
Recall Bias: Missing Information About Ancestor Origin Locations
A potential worry in using survey data about ancestral origin is recall bias. For example, more
educated respondents may have more information on the location of origin of their ancestors. This
is a particularly important issue in the Diagnoza Survey, which only asks about Kresy origin. If
education leads to a higher probability of remembering ancestors (and thus, ancestors from Kresy),
then our results would be biased. In the Diagnoza Survey, we cannot control for this potential
bias. In contrast, in our Ancestor Survey, recall bias is less of a concern, because it should affect
both our ‘treatment group’ of Kresy ancestors as well as the ‘control group’ of ancestors from
other areas. Furthermore, we can use our Ancestry Survey to check whether there is differential
recall bias for people with ancestors from Kresy, i.e., whether remembering (any) ancestor location
is correlated with Kresy origin. We construct, for each respondent, the share of ancestors with
missing information on their location of origin (which is low – only 12% on average). We then
show that i) the share of ancestors with missing information is uncorrelated with Kresy origin, and
ii) controlling for this share does not affect our results. We describe how we built this variable in
Appendix VII.2 and present the results in Table A.25.
6.3 Summary of Mechanisms
Summing up, we have performed numerous checks whose results speak against selection as a
driver of our results and against alternative explanations such as differential returns on education
and congestion of local labor markets. One explanation that is compatible with all our findings is
the prominent – yet debated – argument that forced migration causes a shift in preferences towards
investment in mobile assets, and especially in human capital. The population movements in Poland
after WWII provide a unique setting to test this – notoriously hard-to-isolate – mechanism. Our
results suggest that, indeed, forced migration caused an increase in educational investment among
the affected Poles and their descendants, relative to all other Poles. Further, our findings suggest
that this education premium is driven by a shift in preferences away from material possessions and
towards education.
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7 Conclusion
Forced migration is an important issue in both historical and modern times. The UNHCR estimates
that more than 65 million people are currently displaced from their home regions as a result of
interstate wars, civil conflict, and natural disasters. While the immediate experience of expulsion is
dramatic, the long-run effects on the displaced and their descendants are less clear. Such long-term
effects of forced migration are difficult to distinguish from confounding factors. We collected novel
individual-level data to study the long-run education effects of post-WWII population movements
of Poles expelled from the Eastern Borderlands of Poland (‘Kresy’) that were taken over by the
Soviet Union. We find that the children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of forced Kresy
migrants have significantly higher average education levels than all other Poles. This result holds
in border samples around the Kresy border and is robust to a host of controls. We also show
that descendants of forced migrants value the education of their children more and assign a lower
importance to material possessions. We examine several possible interpretations of these results
and conclude that the most likely is that uprootedness shifted forced migrants’ preferences away
from investment in physical assets and toward investment in portable human capital.
We interpret this result as evidence for the classical ‘uprootedness hypothesis.’ We believe
that uprootedness is an important mechanism in many contexts of forced migration, but often hard
to isolate empirically. The Polish context is particularly well-suited to identify the uprootedness
effect. The results by Nakamura et al. (2017) and Bauer et al. (2013) have a similar flavor, showing
education effects of forced migration. However, in the context of these studies, it is not possible
to separate the uprootedness mechanism from other explanations (such as congestion or lack of
access to local assets, which the Polish context allows us to rule out).
The observed emphasis on education offers a glimmer of hope for descendants of those who
experience expulsion. In view of large refugee flows in many parts of the world, a policy recom-
mendation that emerges from our study is that governments in countries receiving forced migrants
would be well advised to foster access to education to forced migrants and their children. While
the international aid community does consider education as an important factor contributing to the
reduction of economic and social marginalization of refugees (G20, 2017; UNICEF, 2017), our
results show that the benefits of providing schooling for forced migrants may be even higher – and
more persistent – than previously thought.
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Figure 1: Map of Poland’s Territorial Change after WWII
Note: The figure illustrates the re-drawing of Poland’s borders after WWII. The former Eastern Polish territories
(Kresy) became part of the Soviet Union, while the former German areas in the West and North (Western Territories)
became Polish. Poles from Kresy were forced to leave – the vast majority was resettled to the emptied Western
Territories.
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Figure 2: Overview of Historical and Contemporaneous Patterns in Education
Note: The figure shows the reversal in education for forced migrants and their descendants: People at the origin
location of forced migrants (Kresy) had lower education before WWII, while descendants of forced Kresy migrants
today have higher educational attainment. The data are from the 1921 Polish Census and the 2015 Diagnoza Survey.
For 1921, the figure displays literacy rates of Roman Catholics (i.e., ethnic Poles) in the whole of the Second Polish
Republic, which consisted of Kresy (Eastern Borderlands) and Central Poland (CP). Literacy rates were lower in Kresy
than in CP. For today’s Poland, the figure shows the secondary school attainment rate on average, for people without
Kresy ancestors (25,972 respondents), and for people with Kresy ancestors (3,318 respondents).
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Coefficient 90% CI
Figure 3: Ancestors from Kresy and Education, by Birth Cohort
Note: The figure visualizes the results of regressing years of education on Kresy ancestry for different birth cohorts.
The underlying regressions include our standard controls (see note to Table 2) and respondent county fixed effects.
Each bar corresponds to the coefficient on ‘Ancestor from Kresy.’ The pre-1930 birth cohort was at least 16 years
old at the end of WWII and was above schooling age at the time of forced migration. The regressions are run using
the Diagnoza sample for 2015 (Table A.3 in the appendix presents regression results for years of schooling as well as
completion rates of secondary and higher education). Respondents who were still students by the time of the survey
in 2015 are excluded.
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Figure 4: Kresy Border Sample: 1921 Census and Diagnoza Survey
Note: The figure uses only respondents (from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey) with roots in the area of less than 150 km
around the border between Kresy and Central Poland. The left panel shows that there is no difference in literacy in
1921 around the Kresy border. The right panel tracks individuals with roots near the Kresy border by including i)
individuals from the Diagnoza Survey with ancestors from Kresy who lived within less than 150 km to the east of
the border, and ii) individuals without Kresy ancestors who live (today) within less than 150 km to the west of the
border. Dots correspond to data aggregated into 8 km (5 miles) bins for visualization, while the lines are based on all
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Figure 5: Kresy Border Sample: Ancestry Survey
Note: The figure uses respondents from our Ancestry Survey, i.e., individuals who live in the Western Territories today.
Among these, we restrict the sample to people with ancestor roots in the area of less than 150 km around the border
between Kresy and Central Poland. Underlying the figure is an ancestor-level regression, as in specification (2), of
years of education on our standard controls (see note to Table 3) and on respondents’ municipality fixed effects. Dots
correspond to residuals from this regression (aggregated into 8 km (5 miles) bins for visualization), while the lines are
based on all underlying observations, with the shaded area representing 90% confidence intervals. The corresponding
regression results are presented in Table A.11 in the appendix.
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TABLES
Table 1: Overview: Population Census in 1950 (in thousands)
Western Territories Central Poland Share of
(WT) (CP) Western Territories
Total population, 1950 5,602 19,012 22.8%
By Region of Origin:
Lived in Central Poland in 1939 2,785 18,355 13.2%
(49.7%) (96.5%)
Lived in USSR (Kresy) in 1939 1,554 583 72.7%
(27.7%) (3.1%)
Lived in Western Territories in 1939 1,112 19 98.3%
(19.9%) (0.1%)
Lived abroad (not USSR) in 1939 152 53 74.0%
(2.7%) (0.3%)
Notes: The table shows the population of Poland in 1950 by area of residence, as well as origin. Data are from the
1950 Polish census. The three major areas are Kresy (which became part of the Soviet Union after WWII), Central
Poland (which had been and remained Polish), and Western Territories (which had been German and became Polish).
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Table 2: Forced Migration from Kresy and Education – Diagnoza Survey Results
Dependent variable: Individual-Level education, as indicated in each panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: All All All Rural Urban Central Western
(no controls) Poland Territories
Panel A. Dep. Var.: Years of education
Ancestor from Kresy 0.969 0.819 0.801 0.670 0.900 0.933 0.705
(0.080) (0.074) (0.080) (0.123) (0.094) (0.112) (0.100)
Mean Dep. Var. 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.13 12.70 11.94 11.83
Observations 28,341 28,176 28,158 14,111 14,065 21,121 7,055
Panel B. Dep. Var.: Secondary education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.145 0.112 0.110 0.105 0.118 0.112 0.109
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.62 0.50 0.49
Observations 28,343 28,179 28,161 14,120 14,059 21,114 7,065
Panel C. Dep. Var.: Higher education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.106 0.088 0.090 0.061 0.101 0.115 0.063
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.28 0.20 0.20
Observations 28,343 28,179 28,161 14,120 14,059 21,114 7,065
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Respondent county FE X X X X X
Respondent municipality FE X
Notes: The table shows that individuals whose ancestors were expelled from the Kresy territories have significantly
higher levels of education today. Regressions are run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Sur-
vey; standard errors are clustered at the household level.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indi-
cators for rural places and urban counties.
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Table 3: Forced Migration from Kresy and Education in Western Territories: Ancestry Survey
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var.: Years of Education Secondary Higher
Notes on sample: rural urban
Panel A: Respondent-Level Regressions
Ancestor from Kresy 0.769 0.911
(0.107) (0.099)
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 0.744 0.721 0.629 0.760 0.104 0.053
(0.125) (0.131) (0.239) (0.150) (0.020) (0.017)
Share of Ancestors, WT -0.980 -1.005 -0.588 -1.240 -0.169 -0.128
(0.179) (0.194) (0.302) (0.241) (0.029) (0.023)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -0.608 -0.493 -1.917 -0.261 -0.004 -0.038
(0.623) (0.596) (1.397) (0.679) (0.098) (0.090)
Share of Ancestors, rural -0.847 -0.849 -0.995 -0.793 -0.107 -0.072
(0.135) (0.138) (0.330) (0.150) (0.021) (0.019)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Respondent Municipality FE X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.70 12.70 12.71 12.71 11.55 13.22 0.52 0.23
R2 0.01 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.20 0.20
Observations 3,716 3,716 3,668 3,668 1,110 2,558 3,668 3,668
Panel B: Ancestor-Level Regressions
Ancestor from Kresy 0.641 0.648 0.497 0.456 0.342 0.526 0.071 0.045
(0.096) (0.088) (0.092) (0.090) (0.174) (0.107) (0.015) (0.014)
Ancestor from WT -0.898 -0.857 -0.711 -0.971 -0.154 -0.126
(0.136) (0.133) (0.228) (0.175) (0.024) (0.020)
Ancestor from abroad 1.017 1.293 -0.040 2.056 0.152 0.107
(0.976) (0.859) (0.711) (1.182) (0.137) (0.179)
Ancestor from rural area -0.505 -0.517 -0.692 -0.447 -0.071 -0.045
(0.098) (0.093) (0.227) (0.106) (0.016) (0.015)
Grandparent 1.438 0.331 0.394 0.351 0.602 0.348 0.029 0.039
(0.119) (0.163) (0.162) (0.163) (0.284) (0.198) (0.026) (0.021)
Great-grandparent 2.508 0.911 1.023 0.873 0.937 1.021 0.165 0.109
(0.159) (0.229) (0.229) (0.231) (0.401) (0.276) (0.038) (0.035)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Respondent Municipality FE X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.03 13.03 13.04 13.04 11.95 13.54 0.55 0.26
R2 0.07 0.28 0.29 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.23
Observations 11,928 11,928 11,548 11,548 3,617 7,931 11,548 11,548
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, showing that the share of
ancestors from Kresy in a respondent’s family tree is associated with higher levels of education. Regressions are run
at the respondent level in Panel A, and at the ancestor level in Panel B. Robust standard errors (in Panel B clustered at
the level of respondents corresponding to each ancestor) indicated in parentheses.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indicators
for respondents living in rural places and urban counties. Excluded category in columns (3) to (7) is ancestors from
Central Poland.
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Table 4: Main Results for Kresy Migrants from Rural vs. Urban Areas, and from Ukraine Only
Dependent variable: Years of education in 2016, at the respondent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
“Ancestors from Kresy” includes: All Kresy Ancestors Only Kresy Ancestors from Ukraine
Notes on sample: Ancestor location: Anc. and Resp. Ancestor location: Anc. and Resp.
all urban rural all urban all urban rural all urban
Ancestor from Kresy 0.497 0.637 0.429 0.559 0.440 0.588 0.345 0.449
(0.092) (0.160) (0.109) (0.172) (0.110) (0.182) (0.131) (0.197)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.04 13.64 12.84 13.87 12.98 13.52 12.80 13.73
R2 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.34
Observations 11,548 2,950 8,598 2,417 10,237 2,568 7,669 2,080
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, showing that the coefficient on
Kresy ancestors is, if anything, larger for ancestors from urban areas (where expulsion from Kresy was complete), and
that the coefficient is robust to using only the Ukrainian part of Kresy, where expulsions were also nearly complete,
leaving essentially no scope for selection at the origin locations. Regressions are run at the ancestor level; standard
errors clustered by individual respondents.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, and indicators
for respondents living in rural locations and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories, from abroad, and from rural areas, as
well as indicators for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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Table 5: Attitudes towards Education and Material Possessions
Dependent variable: Individual-level outcomes, as indicated in table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High aspiration for edu- Main condition for success in life? % Assets not owned
cation of own children# Material goods Freedom for non-financial reasons†
Ancestor from Kresy 0.080 0.067 -0.076 -0.063 0.017 0.016 0.042 0.034
(0.032) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Years of education 0.047 -0.015 0.001 0.011
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.05 0.05 0.69 0.69
R-squared 0.26 0.29 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.19
Observations 3,800 3,800 22,050 22,050 21,586 21,586 28,019 28,019
Notes: The table shows that descendants of Kresy migrants have stronger preferences for the education of their chil-
dren, value material goods less, value freedom more, and chose to own fewer assets (even if they could afford them).
Regressions are run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered
at the household level.
‡ Baseline Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indi-
cators for rural places and urban counties.
# Diagnoza asks respondents to rank their aspiration for education of their children on a scale from 1 to 5. The de-
pendent variable is an indicator for the highest category. Note that the sample is smaller because this question is not
answered when children have already finished their education.
† Diagnoza asks about the possession of 20 different assets (e.g., apartment, vacation house, garden land plot, ebook
reader, home theatre, boat). For those assets not possessed, respondents are asked if this is for financial reasons. The
dependent variable in columns 7-8 is the number assets not owned for non-financial reasons, divided by the number
of all non-possessed assets.
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Table 6: Other Potential Channels:
Congestion, Returns to Schooling, Out-Migration, Differential Fertility
Dep. Var.: as indicated in table header. Data from Diagnoza.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Analysis: Congestion? Return to Schooling? Out-Migration? Fertility?
Dep. Var.: Years of log(HH income) Intend to go abroad Share of
education Children in HH
Sample WT all WT all all all # children ≥ 1
Ancestor from Kresy 0.732 0.080 0.037 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 0.004
(0.089) (0.040) (0.047) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008)
Sh Autochthons (std) × Kresy 0.137
(0.092)
Years education (std) 0.179 0.210 0.002
(0.010) (0.021) (0.003)
Years edu (std) × Kresy -0.039 0.003 -0.008
(0.025) (0.033) (0.008)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.83 8.45 8.40 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.32
R-squared 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.23
Observations 7,055 18,262 4,422 22,090 14,026 28,122 9,184
Notes: The table examines four alternative mechanisms that may explain the education advantage of people with Kresy
ancestors: congestion due to the presence of autochthons (column 1); differential returns to education (columns 2-3);
differential out-migration (columns 4-5); and differential fertility (columns 6-7). None of these appear to confound the
coefficient on Kresy. Regressions are run at the level of respondents in Diagnoza; standard errors clustered by country.
WT = Western Territories.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indicators for
rural places and urban counties.
45
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173648 
Online Appendix
Forced Migration and Human Capital Accumulation:
Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers
Sascha O. Becker Irena Grosfeld Pauline Grosjean
University of Warwick Paris School of Economics UNSW
Nico Voigtländer Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
UCLA Paris School of Economics
I Background
I.1 Forced Kresy Migrants just before Leaving Kresy and Upon Arrival to WT
Figures A.1 and A.2 presented below exhibit the images of forced Kresy migrants right before
leaving Kresy and right after arriving to the Western Territories. The online exhibition of the
Polish History Museum devoted to forced migrants provides the following testimony as a caption
to the image in the first figure: “And so it happened that ... the marshall came: ‘Leave’ — ‘But
where should I go?’— ‘To Poland.’ And I say: ‘I am in Poland.’ And he says: ‘This is not Poland
anymore.’ ”1
Figure A.1: Forced Kresy Migrants before their Departure from Kresy, Hłyboka (Ukraine), 1946.
Source: The collection of Polish History Museum.
1Edward Jaremko (cited by S. Ciesielski, Exit. Kresy Wschodnie – Ziemie Zachodnie), online exhibit
https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/mwLihxsZye49Lw?hl=pl (Accessed on May 17, 2018).
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Figure A.2: Forced Migrants from Kresy with their Belongings Arriving to Bielawa, former Lan-
genbielau (a locality in the Western Territories), 1946.
Source: Figure 29 in Zaremba (2012).
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I.2 Promotional Poster for Voluntary Migrants from Central Poland to the Western Terri-
tories
Figure A.3 displays a typical example of posters that were used by the authorities in Central Poland
to entice voluntary migration to the Western Territories.
Figure A.3: Advertising to Attract Migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories
Note: The poster’s title reads “The land is waiting.” The text below the picture reads: “The State Repatriation Of-
fice is assigning farms in Opole and Lower Silesia. The regional inspectorates [offices] will provide all necessary
information.”
I.3 Location of the post-WWII Border between Poland and the Soviet Union
The Kresy border (i.e., the post-WWII Eastern border of Poland) was established roughly along the
so-called Curzon line after many discussions between Stalin and the Allies. Named after British
Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, the Curzon line was proposed as the new border between Poland
and the Soviet Union during the 1920 Polish-Soviet conflict, but at the time the actual border of
inter-war Poland was drawn about 250km further East. At the end of World War II, the Curzon
line gained renewed prominence. It is important to note that 7 different versions of the Curzon line
were discussed. They coincided in the central third, where the border follows former administrative
boundaries of the Russian Empire (see also Cienciala, Lebedeva, and Materski, Cienciala et al.).
Figure A.4 portrays the Congress of Poland in yellow, the rest of the Russian Empire in green, the
Kresy border (final Curzon line) in black. We highlight the part of the Kresy border that coincided
with the subnational administrative division within the Russian empire in the past. As can be seen
from the map, only about one third of the Kresy border coincided with administrative divisions of
the Russian Empire. In this area (and not anywhere else), the border is natural âA˘S¸ it was drawn
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along the Bug River. Apart from this partial coincidence, the Curzon line did not coincide with
any former frontiers.
Kresy border
Subnational border within the Russian Empire along Bug River
Poland after WWII
Congress of Poland (part of the Russian Empire)
The rest of the Russian Empire
Figure A.4: Kresy border and former subnational administrative division of the
Russian Empire
Note: Authors’ own map overlaying modern-day Poland with the administrative boundaries of
the Congress of Poland (yellow) and the rest of the Russian Empire.
As mentioned above, there were seven different versions of the new Eastern Polish border that
were discussed during the Tehran Conference. See Figure A.5 presented below. In particular,
the seven different versions coincide in the middle section just described. However, the different
proposed frontiers differed from each other both to the North and to the South of this middle
section (where there are no natural boundaries). In these two areas (contested during the Tehran
conference), the actual Kresy border cuts through the regions of Bialostockie (in the North) and
Lwowskie (in the South). In a robustness check reported below (see Appendix V.4) we focus on
the contested areas in the northern and southern part of the different variants of the Curzon line.
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Figure A.5: Different versions of Curzon line discussed at the Tehran Conference
Note: This map is shows different variants of the Curzon line and is reproduced here under Wikimedia Commons
terms. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Linie_A-F_ang.png.
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I.4 The Timing of Mass Migrations from Kresy and Central Poland
Figure A.6 illustrates that forced migrants from Kresy and voluntary migrants from Central Poland
arrived in the Western Territories (WT) at the same time. Panel A shows data on the stock of
migrants who had arrived in WT by month, during the first two years of mass migration. The data
start in December 1945 and show that by then, 1.5m migrants had moved into WT. That stock
continued to grow steadily, reaching more than 4m migrants by the end of 1947. Panel B displays
the share of Kresy migrants in that stock over time, separately for urban and rural destinations.
Kresy migrants accounted for 40-50% of all migrants throughout this two-year window, in both
urban and rural destinations. This suggests that Kresy migrants and ‘re-settlers’ from CP (the
official label used by the Polish authorities) arrived in parallel throughout the whole period. Thus, a
potential concern that CP migrants moved into WT more quickly, generating a potential congestion
effect for Kresy migrants, is not warranted.
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Figure A.6: The Timing of Arrival of Migrants to the Western Territories
Note: The registry of migrants accounts for re-settlers from Central Poland and forced migrants from Kresy. The
data come from the Document of the Ministry of Recovered Territories, No. 1661 (The Central Archives of Modern
Records in Warsaw).
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I.5 Places of origin of ancestors
Figure A.7: Origin of Ancestors in our Ancestry Survey.
Note: The figure displays the origin of ancestors in our Ancestry Survey. The different dot sizes indicate the number
of ancestors from each respective location. The different areas on the map are described in the note to Figure 1 in the
paper: In the East, the former Eastern Polish territories (Kresy); in the West, the Western Territories, and in the center,
Central Poland.
II Summary Statistics
Tables A.1 and A.2 present summary statistics for the main explanatory and dependent variables.
Table A.1 below presents summary statistics for the variables we use to measure education in both
surveys. Note that in our Ancestry Survey, there is no question on the years of education (see
also footnote 21 in this appendix). We infer this information from the answer to the questions
about educational degrees. We consider four categories: primary education, incomplete secondary
education, completed secondary education, and higher education. Information necessary to con-
struct these variables is present in both Diagnoza and our Ancestry Survey. We impute the years of
education in the Ancestry Survey by using the average years of education for each of the four ed-
ucation categories in Diagnoza, rounded to the nearest integer. In Panel B, we use sample weights
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to account for the oversampling of individuals with Kresy ancestry in our Ancestry Survey (see
footnote 24 in the paper for further discussion on sample weights).2
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Education Variables
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Diagnoza
Education years 28,341 11.910 3.256 0 28
Secondary education 28,343 0.495 0.500 0 1
Higher education 28,343 0.201 0.401 0 1
Panel B: Ancestry Survey (Western Territories): Respondent level
Education years 3,716 12.430 3.316 7 17
Secondary education 3,716 0.467 0.499 0 1
Higher education 3,716 0.221 0.415 0 1
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for education variables in Diag-
noza 2015 and our Ancestry Survey 2016. Panel B uses weights to account
for the oversampling of respondents with Kresy ancestry in our Ancestry
Survey (see Section 3.2 in the paper).
Table A.2 describes variables that capture the origin of ancestors in both surveys. In the Di-
agnoza Survey, 11.4% of respondents have at least one ancestor from Kresy (Panel A). Panels B
and C show that in the Diagnoza Survey, the share of respondents with Kresy origin is higher in
Western Territories (27.3%) than in Central Poland (6.0%) – as one should expect, given that most
forced migrants resettled in WT. In our Ancestry Survey (Panel D), which covers respondents in
Western Territories, 30.8% of respondents have at least one ancestor from Kresy in the generation
in their family with the youngest adults in 1939. The mean share of ancestors from Kresy is 23.6%.
The share from Western Territories is 15.9%, from Central Poland 60.5%, and from abroad 1.4%.3
The mean share of ancestors from rural areas is 75.7%. Finally, Panel E in Table A.2 summarizes
data from our Ancestry Survey at the ancestor level. About 23% of the ancestors are from the
parent generation, 54.7% from the grandparent generation, and 22.5% from the great-grandparent
generation.
2The unweighted sample means are 12.7 years of education, 0.515 for secondary education, and 0.233 for higher
education. These are somewhat higher than the representative (weighted) sample means because respondents with
Kresy ancestors (who have higher education on average) are overrepresented.
3Panel D uses weights to account for the oversampling of respondents with Kresy ancestry in our Ancestry Survey
(see Section 3.2 and footnote 24 in the paper). The unweighted share of ancestors from Kresy is 36.7%.
Appendix p.9
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173648 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Variables Describing the Origin of Ancestors
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Diagnoza: All of Poland
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 28,379 0.114 0.317 0 1
Panel B: Diagnoza: Western Territories
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 7,128 0.273 0.446 0 1
Panel C: Diagnoza: Central Poland
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 21,251 0.060 0.237 0 1
Panel D: Ancestry Survey (Western Territories): Respondent level
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 3,716 0.308 0.462 0 1
Share of ancestors from Kresy 3,716 0.236 0.384 0 1
Share of ancestors from CP 3,716 0.577 0.448 0 1
Share of ancestors from WT 3,716 0.187 0.362 0 1
Share of ancestors from abroad 3,712 0.014 0.084 0 1
Share of ancestors from rural areas 3,671 0.754 0.376 0 1
Panel E: Ancestry Survey (Western Territories): Ancestor level
Ancestor from Kresy 11,928 0.324 0.468 0 1
Ancestor from CP 11,928 0.516 0.500 0 1
Ancestor from WT 11,928 0.160 0.367 0 1
Ancestor from rural area 11,548 0.745 0.436 0 1
Ancestor female 11,928 0.497 0.382 0 1
Parent 11,928 0.229 0.420 0 1
Grandparent 11,928 0.547 0.498 0 1
Great-grandparent 11,928 0.225 0.417 0 1
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for ancestry variables in Diagnoza from 2015
and our Ancestry Survey from 2016. Panel D uses weights to account for the oversam-
pling of respondents with Kresy ancestry in our Ancestry Survey (see Section 3.2 in the
paper). Ancestors from abroad in Panel D are those who lived outside of Poland in 1939
(in countries other than the USSR). In both surveys, we consider the samples of individ-
uals with non-missing information about Kresy origin. For Diagnoza, we further restrict
the sample to respondents with non-missing information about educational attainment,
which is known for all respondents in the Ancestry Survey.
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III Migration Flows Implied by Survey Data vs. Historical Census
III.1 Diagnoza Survey vs. 1950 Census
In this section, we check the quality of the ancestry data from our surveys against migration flows
implied by the 1950 Polish Census. The Diagnoza Survey and the 1950 Census cover all of the
Polish post-WWII territory. The data in the 1950 Census is available at the regional level, providing
information on where respondents lived in 1939 and in 1950. This allows us to construct migration
flows. We begin with migrants from Kresy (i.e. migrants who indicated “USSR” as their place of
residence in 1939). Figure A.8 compares the results of the Diagnoza survey with the 1950 Census.
The left panel displays the share people (in each region) in 1950 who had lived in Kresy in 1939,
plotted against the share of respondents with ancestors from Kresy in the 2015 Diagnoza Survey.
The historical and contemporaneous shares line up very well for most regions.4
For population in the Western Territories, the 1950 Census provides information at the more
disaggregated level of counties. We can thus compute the share of Kresy migrants in each WT
county in 1950. We use this information to repeat the consistency check on the Diagnoza data in
the right panel of Figure A.8. The fit in this county-level exercise is bound to be less precise for
two reasons. First, the post-1950 mobility across county boundaries is higher than across regional
boundaries. Second, in the Diagnoza Survey, the number of respondents in some counties is quite
small, so that measuring the share of respondents with Kresy origin becomes noisier. Despite these
caveats, the right panel of Figure A.8 shows a tight relationship.
III.2 Ancestry Survey vs. 1950 Census
Figure A.9 repeats the above exercise using our 2016 Ancestry Survey in combination with the
1950 Census. Recall that our Ancestry Survey was conducted only in the Western Territories. Cor-
respondingly, we use the available county-level data from the 1950 Census for WT. Our Ancestry
Survey asks about origin locations of all ancestors, including those ancestors who came to WT
from Central Poland (and not only from Kresy, as in Diagnoza). The 1950 Census, in turn, pro-
vides information on overall 16 origin areas (i.e., areas of residence in 1939). These include Kresy,
the Western Territories, and 14 regions in Central Poland. We thus compute, for each county in
WT, the share of migrants from each of these 16 origin areas in 1950. We then map the origin
location data from the Ancestry Survey to the same 16 origin areas. The left panel of Figure A.9
plots the county-level origin shares from the 1950 Census against those from our Ancestry Survey.
The right panel restricts attention to migrants from Kresy, plotting the share of people of Kresy
origin by county from our Ancestry Survey against the same share from the 1950 Census. Both
panels show a strong positive relationship between the data in the two data sources, supporting
the reliability of our Ancestry Survey. In sum, the benchmarking exercises make us confident that
respondents in the Diagnoza Survey and in the Ancestry Survey gave reasonable answers to the
questions about their ancestral places of origin.
4There are a few exceptions. For instance, Warszawa (Warsaw) is considerably below the regression line. This
means that, while in 1950 few people of Kresy origin lived there because the majority moved straight to the Western
Territories, in 2015 the share of Warsaw survey respondents with Kresy ancestors is considerably larger. This is likely
driven by the capital city’s attraction of educated people – among them the descendants of Kresy migrants.
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Figure A.8: Data Quality Check of Diagnoza Survey
Note: The left panel plots the regional share of migrants from Kresy territories in the 1950 Census (y-axis) against
the Kresy migrant share from the 2015 Diagnoza data. The variation is at the regional level. Data are available for
24 regions, covering all of Poland (with separate observations for the parts of regions that were split by the border of
the Western Territories). The regression coefficient is 1.00 with a standard error of 0.057 and R2 of 0.73. The right
panel of the figure plots the county-level share of migrants from Kresy territories in the 1950 Census (y-axis) against
the Kresy migrant share from the 2015 Diagnoza data. These more detailed data are available for 107 counties in the
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Figure A.9: Data Quality Check of our Ancestry Survey – WT Only
Note: The left panel plots the county-level share of migrants from 16 origin territories in the 1950 Census (y-axis)
against the migrant share from the 2016 Ancestry Survey. The 16 origin territories include Kresy, Western Territories,
and 14 regions of pre-WWII Poland. The regression coefficient is 0.69 with a standard error of 0.04 and R2 of 0.59.
The right panel repeats this exercise, but using only migrants from Kresy. The regression coefficient is 0.38 with a
standard error of 0.09 and R2 of 0.19.
IV Main Results: Additional Detail and Robustness
In this section, we present additional results, complementing those in Section 4 in the paper.
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IV.1 Additional Results from the Diagnoza Survey
Table A.3 presents our results for different birth cohorts from the Diagnoza Survey, complementing
Figure 3 in the paper. Column 1 includes only individuals born before 1930 – the oldest respon-
dents in the Diagnoza Survey. Among this group, respondents with Kresy ancestors are likely to
be Kresy migrants themselves. For years of schooling in this cohort, we find a small negative
(and insignificant) coefficient on Kresy ancestry. The same is true for higher education in Panel C.
Panel B shows a very small and insignificant positive coefficient on Kresy ancestry for secondary
education. Thus, in the cohort that was old enough to have finished secondary education, the
proportion with a secondary degree is very similar for individuals expelled from Kresy and other
Poles. This implies that our results are unlikely to be driven by pre-existing educational differences
or by selection of educated migrants from Kresy.
Columns 2-8 in Table A.3 focus on younger cohorts, i.e., those that had not finished schooling
by 1945 or had not even been born. The coefficient on Kresy ancestry is highly significant through-
out and relatively stable, but somewhat larger for older cohorts. This, together with the fact that the
mean of education is higher for younger cohorts, suggests that the relative effect of Kresy origin is
stronger for older cohorts. This is confirmed by Figure A.10, which uses ln(years of education) as
the dependent variable, so that coefficients reflect semi-elasticities that can be directly compared



















Pre-1930s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Birth Decade
Coefficient 90% CI
Figure A.10: Ancestors from Kresy and Education, by Birth Cohort
Note: The figure complements Figure 3 in the paper, using ln(years of education) as the dependent variable, so that
the resulting coefficients (semi-elasticities) can be directly compared across the different birth cohorts.
5Note that column 8 in Table A.3 as well as the last bar in Figure A.10 – for the 1990s birth cohort – exclude
respondents who were still students (see footnote 30 in the paper).
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Table A.3: Kresy Ancestors and Education – Across Cohorts
Dependent variable: Individual-level education, as indicated in each panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth Decade: pre-1930 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Age in 1945: 16+ 6-15 <5 - - - - -
Age in 2015: 86+ 76-85 66-75 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 16-25
Panel A: Dep. Var.: Years of education
Ancestor from Kresy -0.607 1.334 0.927 0.947 1.017 0.890 0.855 0.772
(0.811) (0.278) (0.179) (0.154) (0.172) (0.186) (0.196) (0.196)
Mean Dep. Var. 7.61 9.44 10.50 11.57 12.27 13.07 13.95 12.61
R-squared 0.67 0.44 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.37
Observations 519 2,083 3,360 5,405 4,434 4,152 3,837 2,016
Panel B: Dep. Var.: Secondary education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.046 0.165 0.143 0.136 0.145 0.093 0.080 0.132
(0.092) (0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.041)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.58 0.75 0.62
R-squared 0.59 0.42 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.32
Observations 523 2,085 3,361 5,402 4,435 4,150 3,840 2,018
Panel C: Dep. Var.: Higher education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy -0.069 0.112 0.090 0.106 0.139 0.121 0.060 0.070
(0.075) (0.032) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.29 0.42 0.15
R-squared 0.51 0.27 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.32
Observations 523 2,085 3,361 5,402 4,435 4,150 3,840 2,018
Respondent county FE X X X X X X X X
Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
Notes: The table shows that the results from Table 2 hold across different age cohorts. Regressions are run at the
respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered at the household level. The
1990 cohort in column 8 excludes respondents who were still students at the time of the survey.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indicators for
rural places and urban counties.
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In Table A.4, we verify that higher education of descendants of Kresy migrants translates into
better labor market outcomes. Column 1 shows that respondents with ancestors from Kresy have
about 10% higher household incomes. Column 2 suggests that the higher income is at least partial-
ly driven by higher education – once we control for education, the coefficient on Kresy becomes
smaller and only remains marginally statistically significant. Columns 3-4 show that people with
Kresy ancestors are more likely to have white collar occupations; at the same time, they are less
likely to be unemployed (columns 5-6). These results remain statistically significant even after we
control for education, but the coefficients on Kresy origin become smaller in magnitude.
Table A.4: Labor Market Outcomes
Dep. var.: Individual labor market outcomes, as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ln(HH income) White Collar Job Unemployed
Ancestor from Kresy 0.119 0.068 0.102 0.036 -0.022 -0.015
(0.039) (0.039) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Years of education 0.059 0.074 -0.009
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 8.45 8.45 0.46 0.46 0.08 0.08
R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.41 0.05 0.06
Observations 18,298 18,262 13,516 13,504 18,897 18,859
Notes: The table shows that descendants of Kresy migrants have more favorable labor market outcomes. Regressions
are run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered at the household
level.
‡ Baseline Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as
indicators for rural places and urban counties.
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IV.2 Additional Results from the Ancestry Survey
Weighted Regressions
Table A.5 replicates Panel A of Table 3 from the paper, using respondent-level weights that account
for the oversampling of respondents with Kresy ancestors (as described in Section 3.2). Both the
coefficients and their precision are very similar to those in Table 3 (Panel A) in the paper.
Table A.5: Ancestry Survey Results (Respondent Level): Weighted
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var.: Years of Education Secondary Higher
Notes on sample: rural urban
Ancestor from Kresy 0.883 0.969
(0.118) (0.106)
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 0.804 0.725 0.677 0.773 0.110 0.066
(0.137) (0.144) (0.242) (0.168) (0.021) (0.017)
Share of Ancestors, WT -1.006 -0.993 -0.570 -1.274 -0.162 -0.130
(0.189) (0.194) (0.319) (0.250) (0.031) (0.023)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -1.104 -0.600 -3.448 -0.227 -0.035 0.012
(0.825) (0.640) (1.545) (0.873) (0.108) (0.094)
Share of Ancestors, rural -0.472 -0.545 -0.466 -0.506 -0.059 -0.035
(0.160) (0.156) (0.359) (0.177) (0.024) (0.019)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Respondent Municipality FE X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.43 12.43 12.45 12.45 11.40 12.96 0.47 0.22
R2 0.02 0.29 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.21 0.22
Observations 3,716 3,716 3,668 3,668 1,110 2,558 3,668 3,668
Notes: The table replicates Panel A of Table 3 in the paper, using weights that account for the oversampling of
respondents with Kresy ancestors (as described in Section 3.2). Regressions are run at the respondent level; robust
standard errors indicated in parenthesis. ‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-
decade dummies, as well as indicators for respondents living in rural places and urban counties. Excluded category in
columns (3) to (6) is ancestors from Central Poland.
(Potential) Effect of Kresy Ancestor Majority
In Table A.6, we ask whether the share of ancestors from Kresy matters above and beyond having
any ancestor from Kresy. We include both the dummy for any ancestor from Kresy, together with
an additional indicator variable that takes on value one if the majority of a respondent’s ancestors
(in the 1939 adult generation) are from Kresy.6 The results show that having a majority of ancestors
from Kresy does not add an additional education premium to having ‘any ancestor’ from Kresy.
6We use an indicator for ancestor share from Kresy ≥50% (rather than the share itself) to allow for possible non-
linear effects in the share of Kresy ancestors.
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This suggests that Kresy ancestry is very salient within families. For example, even one ancestor
from Kresy may dominate family conversations about the importance of education.
Table A.6: (Potential) Role of Majority of Kresy Ancestors: Ancestry Survey Results
Dependent variable: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3)
Ancestor from Kresy 1.068 0.957 1.021
(0.221) (0.224) (0.240)
Share of Kresy ancestors ≥ 50% -0.172 -0.057 -0.141
(0.225) (0.228) (0.246)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X
Generation Controls‡ X X
Respondent County FE X X
Respondent Municipality FE X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.70 12.70 12.70
R2 0.27 0.27 0.35
Observations 3,716 3,716 3,716
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, showing that having at least
one ancestor from Kresy is important. Having 50% or more of ancestors from Kresy does not differentially affect
respondents’ education. Regressions are run at the respondent level; robust standard errors indicated in parenthesis.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indicators for
respondents living in rural places and urban counties. Generation controls are indicator variables for whether respon-
dent reports about self (very old respondents), or parental generation (reference category), grandparents’ generation
or great-grandparents’ generation.
Results by Generation of Ancestors
Regressions at the ancestor level raise two potential concerns: first, the number of observations
entering ancestor-level regressions vary across generations. Older respondents reporting about
their parents contribute fewer ancestors to the ancestor-level regressions than younger respondents
who report about up to eight great-grandparents, leading to potential (re-)weighting issues. At
the same time, we saw in Table 2 that the Kresy education effect varies across cohorts. Both
issues can be addressed at once by taking a generational perspective for ancestor-level regressions
in Table A.7. Column 1 repeats our baseline specification for the Ancestry Survey – column
3 of Table 3 in the paper, across all generations combined. Column 2 restricts the sample to
(older) respondents who report about Kresy origin of their parents (their location of residence
in 1939). Column 3 uses only (middle-aged) respondents who report about Kresy origin of their
grandparents. Column 4 restricts the sample to (young) respondents who report about Kresy origin
of their great-grandparents. Effects are somewhat larger for the parent generation, i.e., where
respondents were influenced by the experience of their own parents. This is consistent with the
pattern in Table 3, where the Kresy ancestry effect was strongest for older cohorts who experienced
expulsion first-hand or via their own parents.
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Table A.7: Ancestry Survey Results (Respondent Level): By Generation of Ancestors
Dependent variable: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes on sample: All Parent Grandparent Great-grandparent
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 0.917∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗
(0.121) (0.192) (0.182) (0.352)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.70 11.79 13.02 14.10
R2 0.26 0.30 0.24 0.47
Observations 3,716 1,384 1,869 501
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, showing that the share of an-
cestors from Kresy in a respondent’s family tree is associated with higher levels of education. Results are strongest
for (older) respondents whose parents were forced to migrate from Kresy. Regressions are run at the respondent level;
robust standard errors indicated in parenthesis. from abroad.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indi-
cators for respondents living in rural places and urban counties.
IV.3 Comparing Coefficients at the Respondent vs. Ancestor Level in the Ancestry Survey
In Section 4.2, we presented results of regressions estimated at both the respondent and at the
ancestor level. In what follows, we discuss to what extent the coefficients from these two ap-
proaches are comparable. We begin by explaining an important difference intuitively, and then
turn to Monte-Carlo simulations to derive more general statements.
To fix ideas, we begin by comparing the simplest respondent-level and ancestor-level regres-
sions, both with a dummy for ‘any ancestor from Kresy’: column 2 in Table 3 and column 1
in Table 3. The coefficients are 0.91 and 0.64, respectively. We argue that at least part of this
difference can be explained by a mixed composition of the ‘control group’ in the ancestor-level
regressions: Suppose that in families with mixed ancestors (some from Kresy, some not), Kresy
ancestors dominate discussions about education. This is supported by the evidence in Table A.6
above – suggesting that even one ancestor from Kresy is sufficient to lead to an extra year of
schooling of descendants (i.e., respondents). Also, remember that education outcomes are only
observed at the respondent level. Now suppose a respondent’s mother is from Kresy while her fa-
ther is from Central Poland. Because one ancestor from Kresy is sufficient to create the full Kresy
effect, the respondent will have an extra year of schooling. Now suppose we run an ancestor-level
regression for this respondent. There will be two observations, one for her mother (‘treated’ – from
Kresy), one for her father (‘control’ – not from Kresy). The outcome for both will be one extra
year of schooling. This example illustrates that the ‘control’ group will be contaminated if the
respondent’s family also contains a ‘treated’ ancestor. An obvious remedy is to restrict the ‘con-
trol’ group to those cases where none of the ancestors of a respondent was from Kresy, that is, to
exclude all mixed family cases from the control group. Fortunately, our data contains a large group
of respondents without any ancestor from Kresy (1,997 respondents with 6,551 corresponding an-
cestors from CP and other non-Kresy regions). Table A.8 presents our results. When all ancestors
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are from Kresy, the education effect is 0.85 more years of education – very similar to the results at
the respondent level in Table 3. When we run regressions by generation of the respondents, they
are strongest for the parent generation with a Kresy education effect of 1.08 additional years of
schooling. For the grandparent and great-grandparent generation, the education coefficients are
0.69 and 0.82, respectively, again quite similar to those in respondent-level regressions.
Table A.8: Ancestry Survey Results: Control Group are Respondents with ‘Uniform’ Ancestry
Dependent variable: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes on sample: All Parent Grandparent Great-grandparent
Ancestor from Kresy 0.845 1.083 0.694 0.823
(0.104) (0.183) (0.145) (0.260)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.87 11.72 12.98 13.93
R2 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.49
Observations 10,418 2,614 5,592 2,212
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, and restricts the sample to
respondents where all ancestors or no ancestors at all are from Kresy. Results are strongest for (older) respondents
whose parents were forced to migrate from Kresy. Regressions are run at the respondent level; robust standard errors
indicated in parenthesis. from abroad.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indi-
cators for respondents living in rural places and urban counties.
Econometrically, the respondent-level and ancestor-level regressions are not equivalent. The
following Monte Carlo simulations, while also comparing the point estimates, mainly serve to ad-
dress what can be learned in terms of the level of significance of the respondent-level and ancestor-
level regressions.
We will refer to the following two equations:
Respondent-level: Yi = β Kresyi + φ′ Xi + ηLocality(i) + εi, (A.1)
Ancestor-level: Yi = γKresya(i) + ψ
′Aa(i) + φ′Xi + ηLocality(i) + εa(i) (A.2)
Note that, in line with our specifications (1) and (2) in the paper, in the first equation above,Kresyi
is respondent i’s share of ancestors from Kresy; and in the second equation, Kresya(i) is a dummy
that equals one if ancestor a of respondent i came from Kresy. In addition, we cluster the error
term in the second equation at the respondent level.
The Monte Carlo Simulations yield the following results: as discussed before, the estimated
parameters β and γ, in general, are not equal; yet, importantly, the statistical inference, i.e., the
significance of these parameter estimates, is similar.
First, we find that the parameters β and γ are equal only in the case when dummies for Kresy
origin of different ancestors of the same respondent are perfectly correlated for all respondents.
Formally, this means that for each respondent i, the indicators for Kresy origin of all ancestors
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of this respondent i in the generation of the youngest adults before the war are the same (i.e.,
Kresym(i) = Kresyf(i) , where m and f are ancestors drawn at random from the full set of an-
cestors of respondent i in the considered generation, and this holds for all i).7 Put differently,
ancestor-level regressions yield the same coefficient as respondent-level regressions if all ances-
tors of a given respondent are ‘treated’ (from Kresy) or ‘control’ (not from Kresy), as shown in
Table A.8.
More generally, the parameter γ depends on the correlation between the indicators of Kresy
origin of ancestors of the same respondent. The lower the correlation, the lower is γ (however, it
is bounded below). If that correlation is zero, the parameter γ of the ancestor-level regressions is
equal to the effect of the share of ancestors with Kresy origin of the respondent-level regressions
(β), divided by the average number of ancestors per respondent (N ), i.e., γ = β/N . More formally,
the condition for equality of γ and β is that indicator variables for Kresy origin of any ancestor a(i)
are i.i.d.
The parameter γ is within the interval [β/N ; β] as long as the correlation between indicator
variables of Kresy origin of different ancestors of the same respondent is non-negative (i.e., if one
ancestor drawn at random from the pool of all ancestors of all respondents has a Kresy origin, the
other ancestor drawn at random from the set of ancestors of the same respondent is more likely to
also be of Kresy origin than an ancestor drawn at random from the whole pool of all ancestors of
all respondents).
In reality, the origins are positively correlated across ancestors of the same respondent, but this
correlation is strictly below one, which means that we should expect smaller point estimates in the
ancestor level regressions than in the respondent level regressions. In particular, the correlation
between the dummies indicating the Kresy origin of spouses (e.g., of the mother and father or
of the paternal grandmother and paternal grandfather of the same respondent) is over 90%. The
correlation between dummies for Kresy origin of grandparents from the mother’s and father’s side,
e.g., of the fathers of the parents of the respondent, is over 30%; and the correlation between the
origins of the most distant ancestors, i.e. different great-grandparents, is 7%.
Second, the Monte Carlo simulations show that the level of statistical significance is similar
between the respondent-level regressions and the ancestor-level regressions, when we cluster error
terms at the respondent level. The level of significance is comparable irrespective of the level of
correlation between the origins of different ancestors of the same respondent. Namely, when γ is
below β, the standard errors are also proportionally smaller in the ancestor-level estimation, and
therefore, statistical inference is similar.
Third, both of these facts are true not only for the estimation of the direct effects of Kresy
ancestry (γ vs β), but also for the heterogeneity in the effects. In particular, when we consider an
interaction term between the Kresy ancestor variables (share or dummy in the respondent-level and
ancestor-level regression, respectively) and a characteristic of the place of origin of respondents
ancestors (which is averaged across ancestors in the respondent-level regressions), we find that the
statistical inference is similar in both cases. This is particularly important because in Section 5.1
of the main text, we show that the interactions between the characteristics of the origin locations
and the dummy for Kresy origin of the respondent’s ancestor are statistically insignificant.
7If the considered generation of ancestors is parents, m and f are simply mother and father; if grandparents, these
are two grandparents randomly drawn from the pool of all grandparents of the respondent i, etc.
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To sum up, our Monte Carlo simulations show that t-statistics for the coefficients in the ancestor-
level regressions and in the corresponding t-statistics in the respondent-level regressions are very
similar, suggesting that our statistical inference is correct.
IV.4 Confirming the Main Results in LiTS
Below, we use the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2016 to shed light on the role of war experience
and risk aversion. Here, we show that our main results also hold with LiTS data. An important
drawback of LiTS, and the reason why we do not use it in the main text, is its relatively small
sample size compared to Diagnoza and our Ancestry Survey. The LiTS sample, although nationally
representative, includes fewer than 1,500 respondents in Poland (as opposed to 30,000 respondents
in Diagnoza and more than 4,000 in the Western Territories alone in our Ancestry Survey). The
LiTS survey also asks about the country and region of origin of the respondents’ maternal and
paternal families in 1939, and whether they came from a rural or urban area.8 Of the 1,418 self-
identified ethnic Poles among the 1,500 people sampled in Poland, 1,412 remembered the precise
location of both their father’s and mother’s family in 1939. This allows us to create a dummy
variable for Kresy ancestry of respondents, in the same way as in the Diagnoza Survey. LiTS also
contains similar socio-demographic controls as Diagnoza or the Ancestry Survey.
To check whether our main results hold in LiTS, we need information on education. LiTS
contains one question on education, which asks about the highest education level completed (from
no education to a Masters degree or PhD). We use this to generate years of schooling as well as
indicators for secondary and higher education using the same mapping as in Diagnoza.9 Table
A.9 shows that our main result – the effect of Kresy origin on education – holds also in the LiTS
sample, despite the notably smaller sample size. Controlling for our usual individual-level controls,
for urban or rural family origin, for urban residence, and for region fixed effects, descendants of
Kresy migrants have on average 0.81 extra year of schooling.10 They are 15 percentage points
more likely to finish secondary education, and 13.9 percentage points more likely to graduate from
college. These estimates are slightly larger, but on par with those obtained with the Diagnoza
data.11
8These questions were added to LiTS 2016 based on our proposal.
9We consider that respondents who have completed primary education have seven years of education, those who
have completed lower secondary education have ten, those who have completed (upper) secondary education have
twelve, those who have completed post-secondary non-tertiary education have fourteen, and those who have completed
tertiary education have seventeen years of education.
10Given the substantially smaller LiTS sample size, we cannot run regressions with county fixed effects, only region
fixed effects
11The corresponding estimates in Diagnoza with the same set of controls and with region fixed effects (instead of
county fixed effects as in column 2 of Table 2) are 0.86 extra years of schooling, and 12.5 and 9.3 percentage points
higher likelihood to complete secondary or higher education, respectively.
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Table A.9: Confirming the main education results in LiTS
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Secondary Higher
Education Education Education
Ancestor from Kresy 0.808 0.150 0.139
(0.326) (0.037) (0.039)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X
Region FE X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.85 0.31 0.25
R2 0.25 0.20 0.18
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412
Notes: The table shows that the Kresy education effect also holds in the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS). Sample of
respondents in Poland. Robust standard errors clustered at the Primary Sampling Unit indicated in parenthesis (70
clusters).
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western
Territories, rural/urban residence, and rural/urban origin of mother and father.
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IV.5 Set of questions asked about every ancestor in the generation of youngest adults in the
family in August 1939 in the Ancestry Survey
Q0. Please tell us if anybody from your family âA˘S¸ more precisely, you, your parents, your grandparents, your great
grandparents, or your great great grandparents lived permanently in Kresy in August 1939, just before WWII.
1/ Yes
2/ No
INTRODUCTION: We would like to ask you about your roots. We are interested in the generation in your
family which is the closest to you by age and which was already adult just before the Second World War. We
will ask where your ancestors from this generation lived before the war.
Q1. Please, tell us who in your family was adult (was more than 18 years old) in August 1939, just before the
WWII?
a/ Were you adult?
(if yes, in the following questions the respondent is asked about him/herself)
b/ at least one of your parents was adult?
(if yes, the following questions are about each of the following ancestors: mother and father)
c/ at least one of your grandparents was adult?
(if yes, the following questions are about each of the following ancestors: maternal grandmother, maternal grand-
father, paternal grandmother, and paternal grandfather)
d/ at least one of your great grandparents was adult?
(if yes, the following questions are about each of the following ancestors: mother and father of maternal grand-
mother, maternal grandfather, paternal grandmother, and paternal grandfather)
The following questions are about each of the ancestors in the respective generation of the youngest adults in the
family before WWII (the questions are repeated and the answers are recorded for each ancestor separately):
INTRODUCTION: Now, we would like to know, in as detailed way as possible, where each of the members
of this generation lived just before the WWII.
As your ancestors could live within the previous or current Polish borders, to remind you I will show you the
map on which these borders before the war and after the war are showed. The green and red colours represent
Poland before the WWII, and red and yellow colours represent Poland after the WWII.
Before we ask the next question we would like to remind you that: When we speak about Eastern Kresy
we mean the territories which before the WWII belonged to the Second Polish Republic and since the end of
the war have belonged to the USSR and today belong to Ukraine, Belarus or Lithuania. When we speak about
Central Poland we mean the lands that belong to Poland now and belonged to Poland before WWII. When we
speak about Western and Northern Territories (that used to be called Recovered Territories) we mean lands
that belonged to Germany before WWII and became part of Poland after the WWII. We will refer to these
lands as Western Territories.
A1. Where did your ANCESTOR live permanently in August 1939? Did he/she live:
In the Second Polish Republic:
1/ in Kresy
2/ in Central Poland
Outside the Second Polish Republic:
3/ in Western Territories
4/ in another place in the Third Reich or in another country
5/ in a Free City of Gdansk
6/ Does not concern âA˘S¸ was not born yet (in case that other ancestors from the same generation were the youngest
adults before WWII)
7/ Difficult to say
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8/ Refuse to answer
A2. Was the locality where your ANCESTOR lived:
1/ rural
2/ urban
7/ Difficult to say
8/ Refuse to answer
A3. Do you know the name of this locality?
1/ Yes
2/ No
8/ Refuse to answer
A4. What was the name of the locality?
A5. Do you know to which county (powiat before the war) belonged this locality?
1/ Yes
2/ No
8/ Refuse to answer
A6. What was the name of this county (powiat)?
A7. Do you know what was the closest city next to the locality, where this ANCESTOR lived in August 1939?
1/ Yes
2/ No
8/ Refuse to answer
A8. What was the name of this city?
A9. Do you know in which region (wojewodztwo before the war) was this locality located?
1/ Yes
2/ No
8/ Refuse to answer
A10. What was the name of this region?




7/ Difficult to say
8/ Refuse to answer
A12. Did your ANCESTOR move to Western Territories?
1/ Yes
2/ No
7/ Difficult to say
8/ Refuse to answer
A13. Do you think your ANCESTOR was forced to move to Western Territories? By forced we mean the pressure
exercised by the Soviet or Polish authorities.
1/ Yes
2/ No
7/ Difficult to say
8/ Refuse to answer
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V Border Analysis: Additional Empirical Results
In this section, we present additional evidence in support of our main result.
V.1 Arbitrariness of the Kresy Border
This subsection complements our discussion in Section 2.1 of the paper about the arbitrariness of
the Kresy border and the Kresy border analysis presented in the results section. Figures A.11 and
A.12 examine geo-climatic and agricultural characteristics of counties in a 150 km corridor around
the Kresy border. There is no discontinuity at the Kresy border in any geo-climatic characteristic,
such as mean temperature, precipitation, altitude, or terrain ruggedness. The same is true for the
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Figure A.11: Kresy Border Sample: Geo-climatic Characteristics
Note: The figure shows that there is no discontinuity around the border between Kresy and Central Poland
in terms of geo-climatic characteristics. The figure uses data from FAO, averaged at the county level. Dots
correspond to data aggregated into 8 km (5 miles) bins for visualization, while the lines are based on all
underlying observations, with the shaded area representing 90% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.12: Kresy Border Sample: Crop Suitability
Note: The figure shows that there is no discontinuity around the border between Kresy and Central Poland
in terms of soil suitability. The figure uses data from FAO, averaged at the county level. Dots correspond
to data aggregated into 8 km (5 miles) bins for visualization, while the lines are based on all underlying
observations, with the shaded area representing 90% confidence intervals.
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V.2 Border Analysis in the Diagnoza Survey – Additional Results
Table A.10 complements our border analysis in Section 4.2 in the paper. Note first that in the Kresy
border sample, the means of the dependent variables are very similar to the overall sample means
in Diagnoza (see Table 2, column 1 in the paper). This renders the results directly comparable.
Column 1 in Table A.10 includes our baseline controls; column 2 adds a quadratic polynomial
in latitude and longitude to capture unobservables that may vary around the Kresy border (Dell,
2010).12 In both specifications, we find positive and significant coefficients for Kresy ancestors
that are somewhat larger than those in the main sample (Table 2 in the paper). One reason for the
difference could be that we now use only those Kresy-origin respondents who also remember the
locations where their ancestors lived in 1939. This may be a subsample with particularly vivid
memories of the forced migration experience, augmenting the long-run effects on education. In
column 3 of Table A.10 we restrict the sample to 100 km around the Kresy border. Results remain
very similar. Finally, in columns 4 and 5 we present our results for secondary and higher education,
respectively. Again, we confirm the main results from Table 2.
Table A.10: Border Sample from the Diagnoza Survey
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Years of education Secondary Higher
Notes on sample: < 150km < 150km < 100km < 150km < 150km
Ancestor from Kresy 1.155 1.416 1.256 0.147 0.154
(0.152) (0.255) (0.312) (0.038) (0.033)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
RD Polynomial# X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.02 12.02 11.92 0.51 0.22
Observations 8,760 8,760 5,258 8,761 8,761
Notes: The table uses data from our 2015 Diagnoza Survey, using only ancestors from within the indicated distance
from the Kresy border. These include i) individuals with ancestors from Kresy who lived within less than 150 km (100
km) to the east of the border, and ii) individuals without Kresy ancestors who live (today) within 150 km (100 km) to
the west of the border. Regressions are run at the respondent level; robust standard errors (clustered at the household)
level in parenthesis.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for
Western Territories, rural places and urban counties.
# Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude of i) ancestors’ location of origin to the east of the Kresy border, ii)
respondent’s location (today) to the west of the border.
12Following the argument in Gelman and Imbens (2014) that cubic and higher-order polynomials can yield mis-
leading estimates, we use a second order polynomial. Note that we do not include respondent location fixed effects,
because these would absorb the variation in distance to the west of the Kresy border. This is because we use today’s
location of respondents from CP (i.e., those within 150 km to the west of the Kresy border) as a proxy for their an-
cestors’ place of living. We address this issue below in Table A.11 by using data from our Ancestry Survey, which
includes many respondents whose ancestors lived in CP close to the Kresy border, but who themselves live scattered
throughout the Western Territories today.
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V.3 Border Analysis in our Ancestry Survey – Additional Results
The results shown in this subsection complement our Ancestry Survey border analysis from Sec-
tion 4.2 in the paper. Figure A.13 illustrates the border sample based on our Ancestry Survey data.
It shows the locations of origin places for those ancestors who came from within 150 kilometers
of the Kresy border.
Figure A.13: Origin of Ancestors in our Ancestry Survey.
Note: The figure displays the origin of ancestors in the border sample of our Ancestry Survey – within 150km of the
Kresy border. The different dot sizes indicate the number of ancestors from each respective location. The different
areas on the map are described in the note to Figure 1 in the paper: In the East, the former Eastern Polish territories
(Kresy); in the West, the Western Territories, and in the center, Central Poland.
Table A.11 complements the graphical evidence from Figure 4 in the paper. The table presents
the results of our most demanding specifications: We identify the effect of ancestors’ origin for
individuals living within the same county (columns 1 and 2) or even within the same municipality
(columns 3 to 6) whose ancestors originate from localities close to the Kresy border. In columns
2-6 we use a spatial dimensional RDD that controls for a quadratic polynomial in latitude and
longitude of the ancestor’s origin. Note that results are run at the ancestor level, because the
border discontinuity refers to ancestor locations. We estimate several specifications to illustrate
the robustness of the main result displayed in Figure 4 in the paper. In columns 1 to 4 of Table
A.11, we use years of education as outcome variable and show that the results are robust to using
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samples within 150 and 100 km from the Kresy border. In columns 5 and 6, we report the results for
secondary and higher education, respectively. Results of all specifications are consistently strong
and of similar magnitude as our main results for the Ancestry Survey in Table 3 in the paper.
Table A.11: Education in the Western Territories: Ancestors Originating Near Kresy Border
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Years of education Secondary Higher
Notes on sample: < 150km < 150km < 150km < 100km < 150km < 150km
Ancestor from Kresy 0.876 0.698 0.925 1.416 0.112 0.112
(0.188) (0.350) (0.382) (0.507) (0.057) (0.053)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X X
RD Polynomial# X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X
Respondent Municipality FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.70 12.72 12.72 12.66 0.54 0.24
R2 0.30 0.31 0.44 0.54 0.42 0.37
Observations 3,380 3,291 3,291 1,949 3,291 3,291
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, using only ancestors from
within the indicated distance from the Kresy border. Regressions are run at the ancestor level; robust standard errors
clustered at the respondent level indicated in parenthesis. All columns control for a quadratic polynomial in latitude
and longitude of ancestors’ location of origin.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories and from abroad, as well as indicators
for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
V.4 Ancestors from Contested Kresy Border Areas
In what follows, we present our most restrictive border analysis. We further restrict the border
sample to the contested areas in the northern and southern part of the different variants of the
Curzon line, described in the Appendix I.3 (see in particular Figure A.5). We keep all observations
on ancestors from counties where the majority of the county area is within the envelope formed
by the most extreme proposed variants of the Curzon line. By definition that excludes the central
part of the border, where all proposed variants coincided, i.e., where the location of the border was
uncontested. Put differently, we only use ancestors who – even if they knew about plans to redraw
the Polish borders – could not possibly tell which part of Poland they would be assigned to.
Figure A.14 illustrates the location of ancestors in the contested border sample. Table A.12
presents the corresponding results. First, column 1 shows that there are no pre-existing differences
in education: pre-WWII literacy rates of Roman Catholics (i.e., Poles) are very similar in ancestral
locations on both sides of the (future) Kresy border.13 Next, columns 2 presents the main result:
13In addition, within the contested border sample the share of Poles (measured by Roman Catholics or Polish
speakers in 1931) was also balanced on the two sides of the Kresy border: Using the two variables (with county-level
1931 census data assigned to the location of ancestors) on the left-hand-side in the same specification as column 1
yields small and insignificant coefficients (-0.038 for the share of Roman Catholics and -0.075 for the share of Polish
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education in 2016 is substantially higher for descendants of Kresy ancestors. This holds also in
column 3, where we add ancestor controls.
Figure A.14: Contested Border Sample: Origin Locations of Ancestors
Note: This map shows the locations of ancestors who lived in counties whose midpoint was located within the con-
tested areas of the Curzon line, as described in Appendix I.3.
speakers with standard errors of 0.078 and 0.051, respectively). This helps to address the concern that our results may
be driven by Poles being one of many ethnicities in Kresy, i.e., that the share of Poles in Kresy was lower than in
Central Poland. We further discuss this issue below and present interaction results in columns 1-5 of Table A.13.
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Table A.12: Subsample of Ancestors from Contested Kresy Border Areas
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: Literacy Years of Schooling
Rate 1921
Ancestor from Kresy -0.008 0.942 0.850
(0.034) (0.473) (0.489)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X
Ancestor Controls† X
Respondent County FE X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.65 12.46 12.47
R2 0.46 0.44 0.46
Observations 1,070 1,078 1,058
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, using only ancestors from
counties located within the contested area of the Kresy border, as shown in Figure A.14. Regressions are run at the
ancestor level. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories and from abroad, as well as indicators
for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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VI Threats to Identification: Additional Results
In this appendix, we provide detailed results that complement Section 5 in the paper.
VI.1 Characteristics at Origin Locations: Potential Heterogeneous Effects
Could different characteristics of migrants’ origin locations affect our results? We analyze this pos-
sibility in Tables A.13 and A.14, testing for possible differential effects of Kresy origin depending
on characteristics at the ancestors’ place of origin. In particular, we run regressions at the ancestor
level, in which we include interactions between the dummy for Kresy ancestry and (standardized)
county-level characteristics of the place of origin of the respective ancestor, controlling also for
the characteristics at the place of origin.14 In Table A.14, we also include interactions of climatic
characteristics at the destination location.
Table A.13 examines the heterogeneity with respect to various measures of diversity at the
origin location. In particular, we consider the following pre-WWII county level variables: the
share of Roman Catholics, the share of Polish speakers, the share of Ukrainian speakers, the share
of Russian speakers, the total literacy rate and the literacy rate among Roman Catholics, as well
as the urbanization rate. We find no differential effects of Kresy origin on years of education
with respect to any of these characteristics – the interaction coefficients are quantitatively small
and statistically insignificant throughout. The same is true for Table A.14, where we consider
heterogeneity with respect to land suitability for wheat (which was the main crop in pre-WWII
Kresy), mean temperature, the precipitation-evatranspiration ratio, and ruggedness of the origin
locations, both at the ancestor origin and destination (respondent location). The evidence in Tables
A.13 and A.14 suggests that the effect of Kresy origin is driven by forced migration itself, rather
than by the characteristics of the origin of Kresy migrants.
Note, in particular, the results in columns 1-5 in Table A.13. These explore whether the com-
position of the population at the origin location affects our main result. This is a potential concern,
given that Kresy was a multi-ethnicity area. We find that our main result does not vary with the
share of Poles (measured either as Roman Catholics or Polish speakers), Ukrainians, or Russians
at the ancestors’ origin locations: The interaction between Kresy and each of these shares is small,
negative, and insignificant.15 Overall, the results in columns 2-5 suggest that Kresy being a multi-
ethnicity area does not drive our results.
14Since we use interaction terms with county-of-origin characteristics, we use two-way clustering both at the re-
spondent i level and at the level of ancestors’ county of origin.
15In column 3 we allow for potential non-linearities by using an indicator for above-median share of Polish speakers.
Both the indicator itself and the interaction coefficient are statistically insignificant and positive. The positive signs
mean that if anything, the education premium is larger where there were relatively more Poles. Thus, the fact that
there were relatively fewer Poles in Kresy than in Central Poland works against our main result.
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Table A.13: No Heterogeneous Effects with Respect to Ancestors’ Origin Characteristics
Dependent variable: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.536 0.538 0.502 0.568 0.463 0.509 0.568 0.497 0.500
(0.130) (0.140) (0.164) (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.097) (0.103) (0.097)
Share Rom. Cath., 1931 (std) 0.056
(0.114)
Rom. Cath., 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.056
(0.141)
Share Polish speakers, 1931 (std) 0.038
(0.136)
Polish speakers, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.022
(0.168)
Share Polish Speakers (1931) above median 0.029
(0.168)
Share Polish Speakers (1931) above median × Kresy 0.188
(0.235)
Share Ukrainian speakers, 1931 (std) -0.013
(0.125)
Ukrainian speakers, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.060
(0.126)
Share Russian speakers, 1931 (std) 0.192
(0.212)
Russian speakers, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.160
(0.213)
Literacy rate, 1931 (std) -0.026
(0.081)
Literacy rate, 1931 (std) × Kresy 0.055
(0.094)
Urbanization rate, 1931 (std) 0.043
(0.061)
Urbanization rate, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.088
(0.058)
Literacy rate, 1921 (std) 0.001
(0.077)
Literacy rate, 1921 (std) × Kresy -0.001
(0.093)
Literacy rate Rom. Cath., 1921 (std) 0.011
(0.067)
Literacy rate Rom. Cath., 1921 (std) × Kresy 0.008
(0.085)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.15 13.14 13.14
R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Observations 9,706 9,706 9,706 9,706 9,706 9,667 8,613 9,645 9,645
Notes: The table uses data from our Ancestry Survey. Regressions are run at the ancestor level. The table shows that
the coefficient on Kresy ancestry does not vary significantly with average characteristics of the population at the place
of origin. Standard errors clustered using two-way clustering by individual respondents and by county of origin.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories and from abroad, as well as indicators
for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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Table A.14: No Heterogeneous Effects w.r.t. Geographic Features at Ancestors’ Origin
Dependent variable: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.574 0.481 0.576 0.546
(0.102) (0.119) (0.103) (0.097)
Land suitability for wheat at origin (std) -0.042
(0.081)
Land suit. for wheat (std) × Kresy 0.020
(0.096)
Annual temperature at origin (std) 0.048
(0.088)
Annual temperature (std) × Kresy -0.180
(0.116)
Precip.-evatranspiration ratio at origin (std) -0.021
(0.064)
Precip.-evatranspiration ratio (std) × Kresy -0.043
(0.099)
Ruggedness at origin (std) 0.030
(0.046)
Ruggedness (std) × Kresy -0.070
(0.082)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.15 13.15 13.15 13.15
R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Observations 8,793 8,793 8,793 8,793
Notes: The table uses data from our Ancestry Survey. Regressions are run at the ancestor level. The table shows that
the coefficient on Kresy ancestry does not vary systematically with geographic characteristics at the place of origin.
Standard errors clustered using two-way clustering by individual respondents and by county of origin.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories and from abroad, as well as indicators
for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
VI.2 Differential War Exposure or Victimization – Using Data from LiTS
A potential concern for our analysis is that exposure to conflict during WWII was different for
those living in the Kresy territories compared with those living in Central Poland. If this were the
case, then our estimated treatment effect of ‘uprootedness’ could be confounded with the effect
of a legacy of victimization during WWII. The existing literature finds that the effect of conflict
on educational attainment is negative (for a review see Buvinic, Gupta, and Shemyakina, 2014).
However, this finding is limited to directly-affected cohorts. In the case of Europe during WWII,
Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) examine the educational attainment of children born in 1920-
1949. They find that the cohorts born in 1930-1939 (those who reached age 10 during or soon
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after the war) who lived in countries heavily engaged in the conflict (e.g., Austria and Germany)
completed less schooling compared to other cohorts in the same country or similar cohorts in
countries that were not directly engaged in the conflict (e.g., Sweden and Switzerland). Ichino and
Winter-Ebmer (2004) also find that the disruptive effects of conflict on education do not persist;
only the cohort of schooling age during the conflict is affected. For other cohorts, no effect is
found, even for individuals who were directly affected by the conflict by, for example, the death of
a parent.
In this section, we show that ancestors in Kresy were exposed to somewhat higher violence
during WWII. According to the findings in the previous literature, this should introduce a down-
ward bias in the ‘Kresy education effect’ for those who were displaced when they were of school
age. For later generations – the largest group of respondents in our surveys – we should expect no
bias. Consistent with this prediction, based on the previous literature, we show that our results are
robust to controlling for differences in exposure to violence during WWII.
Administrative data on war destruction exist only for the post-war Polish territory. Therefore,
we are unable to draw on administrative sources to measure differential war experience (or de-
struction) on both sides of the Curzon Line. Also, neither of our two surveys (Diagnoza and our
own Ancestry Survey) has information on war experience. However, the Life in Transition Survey
2016, which we introduced earlier in Appendix IV.4, has information about war experience com-
bined with information about the origin of ancestors of the respondent. LiTS asks the following
question on victimization during WWII: “Were you, your parents or any of your grandparents
physically injured, or were your parents or any of your grandparents killed during the Second
World War?” 35.3% of Polish respondents answered affirmatively.16
In Table A.15, we analyze the role of war time experience by the respondents’ ancestors. We
first show that Kresy ancestors are more likely to have been victimized during WWII (column 1).
Yet, controlling for a family history of victimization does not affect our main result: We show in
columns 2 and 3 that Kresy ancestry is still positively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated
with educational attainment after controlling for family history of war victimization, irrespective
of whether we consider a missing family history of victimization as non victimization (column 2)
or truly missing (column 3). A family history of victimization in WWII itself is never significantly
associated with educational attainment.17 Overall, the findings using LiTS data suggest that our
main results are not confounded by differential war exposure of forced migrants from Kresy.
VI.3 Differences between Effects in Western Territories and Central Poland
Table A.16 restricts the Diagnoza sample to respondents with Kresy ancestors. It compares their
education in the Western Territories and in Central Poland. Odd columns in Table A.16 show
the raw differences (after controlling for individual characteristics). Note that we cannot control
for local fixed effects in these specifications because the table compares individuals with Kresy
16Around 10% answered that they did not know. Our results are unaffected whether we code these as missing or as
not victimized.
17For brevity of exposition, we only report results for years of education, but the results are similar when we consider
completion of secondary or higher education as dependent variables. Controlling for a family history of victimization
in WWII, Kresy descendants are 14.1 and 12.9 percentage points more likely to complete secondary and higher
education, respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and practically indistinguishable
from the baseline LiTS estimates in columns 2 and 3 of Table A.9.
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Table A.15: Robustness of Education Results in LiTS and WWII Victimization
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: Family victimized Years of Years of
during WII schooling schooling
Ancestor from Kresy 0.367 0.734 0.673
(0.062) (0.328) (0.332)
Family killed or injured in WWII (missing = 0) 0.203
(0.183)
Family killed or injured in WWII 0.174
(0.180)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X
Region FE X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.35 12.85 12.80
R2 0.16 0.25 0.26
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,265
Notes: The table uses data from the 2016 Life in Transition Survey sample. Sample of respondents in Poland. Robust
standard errors clustered at the Primary Sampling Unit indicated in parenthesis (70 clusters).
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, , as well as indicators for
Western Territories, rural/urban residence, and rural/urban origin of mother and father.
ancestors across regions. Thus, differences in local labor markets affect the results. To account
for at least some of this variation, even columns include an indicator for individuals who live in
the counties of Warsaw or Cracow – the main university centers in Poland. The results imply that
controlling for these educational centers is important, as it reduces the difference between WT and
CP. We find that – after accounting for Warsaw and Cracow – respondents with Kresy ancestors
who live in the Western Territories have, on average, 0.44 fewer years of education and are 5.0
and 6.0 percentage points less likely to complete secondary and higher education, respectively, as
compared to respondents with Kresy ancestors who live in Central Poland.18 Thus, our Ancestry
Survey results in the Western Territories – which show a significant education advantage of people
with Kresy ancestors – are, if anything, underestimating the effect for Poland overall.
VI.4 Selection of Voluntary Migrants? Differences in Literacy at Counties of Origin
Table A.17 compares the historical literacy rates in the counties of origin of ancestors from Kresy
and from Central Poland, verifying that our main results hold in the subsample of ancestors for
which information on historical (county-level) literacy rates is available. Regressions are run at
the ancestor level, with secondary education as the contemporaneous measure for education in odd
columns (see footnote 3), and with historical literacy in even columns. Panel A uses literacy of
Roman Catholics from the 1921 Polish Census that covered all of the Second Polish Republic;
Panel B uses literacy of Poles in the Polish language from the 1897 Russian Empire Census, cov-
18Note that the counties Warsaw and Cracow are geographically smaller than commuting zones. When we account
for larger areas – by using indicators for the Voivodeships of Mazowieckie and Lesser Poland (Małopolska), i.e., the
areas around Warsaw and Cracow – the coefficients on Western Territories become even smaller.
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Table A.16: Education of Kresy Migrants in the Western Territories and Central Poland
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Years of education Secondary education Higher education
Dummy for Western Territories -0.714 -0.501 -0.071 -0.056 -0.089 -0.065
(0.137) (0.139) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Warsaw or Krakow 2.137 0.152 0.236
(0.335) (0.031) (0.046)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.77 12.77 0.62 0.62 0.29 0.29
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17
Observations 3,196 3,196 3,198 3,198 3,198 3,198
Notes: Regressions are run at the respondent level, restricting the sample to individuals with ancestors from Kresy in
the Diagnoza Survey. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ‘Warsaw or Cracow’ is an indicator that
takes on value one for the counties of Warsaw and Cracow.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
ering the Russian partition of Poland, which after 1918 became a part of the SPR.19 Column 1
replicates our main results in the subsamples for which the historical literacy data at the ancestors’
origins are available: We find that in both samples, respondents with Kresy ancestors have sig-
nificantly higher secondary education than respondents with ancestors from Central Poland who
live in the same county today. Column 2 uses historical literacy rates as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on the Kresy dummy in this regression shows the average difference in historical
literacy rates between counties in Kresy and in Central Poland from which respondents’ ancestors
originated. Because we use respondent county fixed effects, we compare historical literacy rates
at the origin of ancestors whose descendants today live in the same counties in WT. According to
the results in column 2, Kresy ancestors came on average from locations with a 3 percentage point
lower literacy rate. Columns 3-6 show that a similar pattern of ‘reversal of education’ holds when
we restrict the sample to ancestors from rural origin locations or to those from urban origins.
19The number of observations in Panel B is lower because the Western part of Central Poland was part of the German
Empire, and the southern-most part of Kresy and of Central Poland belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Note
also that neither of these historical censuses cover the Western Territories (which belonged to Germany).
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Table A.17: Education Today and Historically in Counties of Origin of Ancestors
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Secondary Edu Historical Secondary Edu Historical Secondary Edu Historical
in 2016 Literacy in 2016 Literacy in 2016 Literacy
Sample. Ancestor from: Rural or Urban origin Rural origin Urban origin
Panel A: Literacy from the 1921 Polish Census (Ancestors from Kresy and CP)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.073 -0.030 0.060 -0.040 0.107 -0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024)
Ancestor from rural area -0.068 -0.170
(0.017) (0.013)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.57 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.75
R2 0.22 0.37 0.24 0.11 0.27 0.21
Observations 9,645 9,645 7,161 7,161 2,484 2,484
Panel B: Literacy from the 1897 Russian Census (Ancestors from the former Russian Partition)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.147 -0.031 0.142 -0.030 0.143 -0.031
(0.030) (0.014) (0.034) (0.014) (0.066) (0.015)
Ancestor from rural area -0.035 0.002
(0.033) (0.005)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.58 0.16 0.57 0.16 0.63 0.15
R2 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.64 0.57
Observations 2,177 2,177 1,744 1,744 433 433
Notes: The table shows that descendants of Kresy migrants have significantly higher rates of secondary education
today (odd columns), while their ancestors came – on average – from counties with lower literacy (even columns):
The coefficient on Kresy in even columns reflects the average difference in historical literacy rates between counties in
Kresy and in Central Poland from which respondents’ ancestors originated. Regressions are run at the ancestor level,
using data from our Ancestry Survey. Standard errors clustered by individual respondents in odd columns and using
two-way clustering by individual respondents and by county of origin in even columns.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indi-
cators for respondents living in rural locations and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories and from abroad, as well as indicators
for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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VI.5 Selection of Voluntary Migrants? Individual Differences
In what follows, we show that individual selection of voluntary migrants from CP is unlikely to
affect our results. To implement this check, we focus on respondents whose ancestors moved
from CP to WT. From our Ancestry Survey, we know their county of origin in Central Poland.
We also know the education level today in these origin counties, from respondents in the Diagnoza
Survey.20 Using the combined information, we construct the following variable for each respondent
i:
∆Edu(i) = EduWT (i)− E [EduCPcounty (a(i))] (A.3)
where EduWT (i) is today’s education of respondent i living in WT, whose ancestors came from




denotes the average education today in the CP county of origin of
ancestor a of respondent i. E [ · ] is the average education across origin counties of all ancestors
of respondent i. Since we only look at descendants of migrants from CP, all these counties are in
Central Poland.
Table A.18 presents the results for the null hypothesis that ∆Edu(i) = 0 for secondary educa-
tion and for higher education.21 Columns 1 and 2 show positive differences, i.e., that descendants
of CP migrants who now live in WT have on average slightly higher education than their ‘cousins’
in their ancestors’ origin counties in CP. This result could be driven by migration from rural areas
in CP to cities in WT: Since education is higher in urban areas, destinations would tend to show
higher education than origin locations.22 To account for this possibility, we restrict the sample to
individuals for whom both origin and destination locations were urban (columns 3 and 4) or rural
(columns 5 and 6). In all cases, the differences are small and statistically insignificant. This sug-
gests that the positive differences shown in columns 1 and 2 are in part driven by rural-to-urban
migration.23 Another possible explanation for the positive ∆Edu(i) in columns 1 and 2 is that CP
migrants from rural areas who came to WT cities may have been positively selected. Ultimately,
we cannot differentiate between selection among historical migrants and other potential mecha-
nisms that may drive the observed (small) educational gap.24 Nevertheless, the results from Table
20We only use Diagnoza respondents in Central Poland without any ancestors from Kresy. Similarly, we restrict the
subsample from our Ancestry Survey to those respondents who have only ancestors from Central Poland.
21The definition of years of education is different across the two surveys. In Diagnoza, this variable is the self-
reported number of years spent in educational institutions. In contrast, in our Ancestry Survey years of education are
imputed using four educational categories. While years of education are comparable for different observations within
each survey, they are not directly comparable between the two data sources. As ∆Edu(i) entails the comparison of
values across the two surveys, we do not use years of education in this analysis.
22Note that this concern is specific to the analysis in Table A.18, which compares individuals across locations and
therefore does not use location fixed effects. In contrast, all our main results hold with municipality fixed effects,
which absorb (among many others) average differences across urban vs. rural areas. In addition, our main results hold
in the rural and urban subsamples when we control at the same time for the rural origin of ancestors (see columns 4
and 5 in Table 3).
23In fact, if we restrict the sample to respondents in urban areas of WT with ancestors from rural CP areas, we –
unsurprisingly – obtain significantly positive differences.
24For example, an alternative story is that migrants, even when not forced, revise upward the importance of human
capital. This would be similar to the mechanism for forced migrants, but not as strong – thus placing voluntary
migrants between stayers and forced migrants in terms of their education. Another possible explanation is related to
labor market spillovers in Western Territories from educated descendants of Kresy migrants onto descendants of CP
migrants. This would be consistent with spillovers as documented by Semrad (2015). Note also that, on average,
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A.18 are relevant for interpreting the coefficient on Kresy origin in our Ancestry Survey regres-
sions. They suggest that our control group – descendants of migrants from CP who now live in
WT – are on average, if anything, somewhat better educated than their closest comparison groups.
Thus, our Ancestry Survey results tend to underestimate the effect for Kresy origin in the Western
Territories.
Table A.18: Education Difference Between Destination and Origin of Migrants from CP to WT
Dep. Var.: Difference in education, variable indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Secondary Higher Secondary Higher Secondary Higher
Education Education Education Education Education Education
Sample: Urban or Rural Urban origin Rural origin
& destination & destination
∆Edu(i) 0.027 0.042 0.012 0.041 -0.028 -0.005
(0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.016)
Observations 1,391 1,391 323 323 347 347
Notes: The table combines data from our Ancestry Survey with Diagnoza data. The table provides the results from
estimating equation (A.3). This addresses the possibility of individual selection of voluntary migrants from Central
Poland to the Western Territories (which would affect the composition of the control group in our Ancestry Survey
results). The table shows that respondents in WT who are descendants of migrants from Central Poland are, if anything,
slightly better educated than a reasonable comparison group – people who still live in the places of their ancestors’
origin in Central Poland.
education in CP and WT today is very similar (see Figure 2). Consequently, it is unlikely that CP migrants merely
benefitted from a generally better education system in WT.
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VII Additional Results on Mechanisms
We begin this section by looking more closely at our proposed mechanism to explain the Kresy
education effect: a shift in preferences towards education as a portable asset, and away from phys-
ical assets, which we see as capturing the classical uprootedness hypothesis (Appendix VII.1). We
then move on to discuss alternative mechanisms in Appendix VII.2, showing that they are unlikely
to explain our results. We conclude by showing that recall bias by survey respondents does not
confound our findings (Appendix VII.3).
VII.1 Potential Reasons Underlying the Shift in Preferences towards Education
Our proposed mechanism to explain the Kresy education effect is a shift in preferences towards
education as a portable asset, and away from physical assets, as a result of uprootedness. The
evidence presented in Table 5 in the paper could have multiple reasons, which we alluded to in
footnote 43 in the main text. While we cannot formally test the relative contribution of each
possible explanation, this section discusses some evidence for or against five possible candidates.25
Perceived Risk of Repeated Forced Migration
Experiencing forced migration (or having a family history of forced migration) may affect the
subjective probability that individuals attach to being forced to migrate again in the future. As a
consequence, Kresy migrants would invest more in portable assets, i.e., human capital. In Section
2.3, we gave anecdotal evidence for a higher degree of perceived uncertainty about the future status
of the Western Territories by Kresy migrants. Along the same line of argument, descendants of
Kresy migrants may (still) believe that property rights are less secure and thus own fewer physical
assets, relative to their budget. While this interpretation is potentially at play for earlier generations
of Kresy descendants, it is unlikely to drive results for younger cohorts: Property rights became
more secure in the early 1990s, after the end of the Socialist era and the ratification of the final
treaty regarding the Polish-German border (see footnote 17 in the main text). Yet, our results on
education are stable for cohorts born around 1990 (see Figure 3 in the paper). Thus, our long-run
results are more compatible with a persistent change in preferences for education, as opposed to a
persistent change in beliefs about property rights.
Education as (Partial) ‘Insurance’ Against Negative Shocks
Did forced migration increase the subjective probability that negative events can happen? If this
were the case, education might provide (partial) protection, complemented by savings/insurance
holdings. In order to address this possibility, we explore the richness of the Diagnoza Survey,
which provides data on financial investments and insurance. More specifically, we extracted all
variables that are related to insurance and savings/financial investment. There are three types of
variables: 1) whether respondents have savings and what kind; 2) data on the purpose of savings;
3) whether respondents have insurance. Note that Diagnoza respondents do not report monetary
values, but the extensive margin.
Respondents with Kresy origin are more likely to hold savings and insurance, conditional on
income and education (see Table A.19, first and last column).26 Both are consistent with the
25We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to look at these to provide a more nuanced discussion of our main
finding.
26Note that savings information is provided by the household head and hence available for all (adult) household
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idea that descendants of forced migrants have a preference for insurance against possible negative
events. It is particularly instructive to look at the purpose of savings (conditional on holdings
savings). According to Table A.19, respondents with Kresy origin are significantly less likely
to save for every day consumer needs or for durable goods (columns 2 and 3), but significantly
more likely to save in order to accumulate ‘reserves for unexpected events’ (column 4) and for
‘security for the old age’ (column 5). This suggests that descendants of forced migrants have a
higher precautionary saving motive.27 This can be due to two underlying reasons: 1) descendants
of forced migrants may have a higher perceived likelihood that negative shocks will occur, with
savings working as an ‘insurance’ mechanisms; 2) the perceived likelihood of shocks may be the
same, but people with Kresy roots may be more risk averse. We discuss the latter in the next point.
Table A.19: Household Savings and Individual-Level Insurance in Diagnoza
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HH Savings Motive (Conditional on Holding Savings) Individual
has Everyday Durable Unexpected Old has
Savings Consumption Consumption Events Age Insurance
Ancestor from Kresy 0.043 -0.057 -0.030 0.042 0.064 0.037
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X X
Education and HH income X X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.44 0.40 0.22 0.63 0.29 0.58
Observations 27,357 17,719 17,712 17,736 17,712 21,259
Notes: The table shows differences in household savings and individual-level insurance in Diagnoza. Regressions are
run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered at the household
level. The last column stems from individual-level responses whereas the first columns are based on responses pro-
vided by the household head.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as indi-
cators for rural places and urban counties.
Risk Aversion
Can forced migration affect people’s risk preferences and, as a consequence, their educational
choices? We can address this question using the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2016 (see Ap-
pendix IV.4 for a more detail on the LiTS data). LiTS asks respondents about their willingness to
take risks on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means they are not willing to take risks at all, and 10
and means they are very much willing to take risks.
members whereas insurance information comes from individual-level responses and has more missings as a result of
item non-response.
27There is no significant difference for any other purposes of savings: for example, to pay regular fees such as home
payments, for purchase/renovation of house or apartment, or for medical treatments.
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Column 1 in Table A.20 shows that Poles with Kresy origin in LiTS are somewhat less willing
to take risks (but this difference is not statistically significant). If Kresy people have no differential
degree of risk aversion (subject to the caveat of the smaller sample size of LiTS), the finding of
their higher saving for unexpected events is consistent with a higher perception of the likelihood
of risky events. We cautiously interpret this evidence as giving support to the hypothesis that for
forced migrants, the possibility of bad events occurring in the future is more salient, so they hold
more insurance and precautionary savings.
Columns 2-4 in Table A.20 show that controlling for risk aversion does not affect our main
results: When including risk aversion as a control, respondents with an ancestor from Kresy have
0.86 additional years of education (compared with a baseline estimate in the LiTS survey of 0.81
years in Table A.9); they are 15.2 p.p. more likely to complete secondary education and 14.5 p.p.
more likely to complete tertiary education (compared to baseline estimates of 15.0 p.p. and 13.9
p.p., respectively, in Table A.9).
Table A.20: Education and Risk-Aversion in the 2016 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS)
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Willingness to take Years of Secondary Higher
risk (scale 1-10) Education Education Education
Ancestor from Kresy -0.556 0.855 0.152 0.145
(0.352) (0.329) (0.037) (0.041)
Willingness to take risk (scale 1-10) 0.119 0.006 0.013
(0.043) (0.008) (0.005)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X
Region FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 4.84 12.86 0.31 0.25
R2 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.18
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406
Notes: The table shows that respondents with Kresy ancestry are marginallyless willing to take risk (column 1). The
Kresy education effect is robust to controling for the willingness to take risk (columns 2-4). Sample of respondents in
Poland. Robust standard errors clustered at the Primary Sampling Unit indicated in parenthesis (70 clusters).
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for
Western Territories, rural/urban residence, and rural/urban origin of mother and father.
Discount Factors
Could forced migration make people more patient and thus willing to invest more in education?
None of the three surveys that we use has a direct measure of discount rates. A proxy used in
some of the economics literature (e.g., Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer, 2003) is smoking behavior,
which may reflect higher discount rates. Diagnoza has information on smoking. Table A.21 shows
that respondents with Kresy origin are less likely to smoke (i.e., have lower discount rates). We
find, however, that our main results are not affected when we control for smoking behaviour of
respondents.
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Table A.21: Education and smoking (as a proxy for discount rates) in Diagnoza
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Smoking Years of Secondary Higher
(Yes=1) Education Education Education
Ancestor from Kresy -0.035 0.823 0.111 0.091
(0.011) (0.081) (0.012) (0.011)
Smoking -0.712 -0.121 -0.105
(0.046) (0.008) (0.006)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.23 11.98 0.51 0.21
Observations 22,100 22,070 22,063 22,063
Notes: The table shows that respondents with Kresy ancestry are less likely to smoke (column 1). The Kresy
education effect is robust to controling for smoking (columns 2-4). The table uses data from Diagnoza. Standard
errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
Valuation of Education per se
Our results are consistent with a higher valuation of education per se. This channel is strongly
supported by our results in Table 5, which showed that parents with ancestry from Kresy have
higher ‘aspiration for education of [their] own children,’ even conditional on their own education.
Overall, we conclude that our results are likely driven by a combination of two factors: 1) an
increase in the value of education and 2) an increase in the salience of potential negative events
occurring in the future.
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VII.2 Alternative Mechanisms: Additional Results
Congestion – Polish Ancestry of Autochthons
Figure A.15 illustrates that the county-level share of autochthons in the 1950 Polish Census is
highly correlated with the share of Polish speakers in the German Census of 1900. The 1900
German Empire Census was the last census in the German Empire that collected information on
language spoken at home. Autochthons in the 1950 Polish Census are the people who had lived
in the territories that Germany lost to Poland as a result of WWII and were not expelled, as they
declared themselves to be Polish. Figure A.15 illustrates that autochthons are indeed largely people
with ethnic Polish ancestry. They had German nationality in German censuses of the inter-war
period, but were no longer separately identified in German statistics until the Polish Census of
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Figure A.15: Two Alternative Measures of the Share of Autochthons across WT Counties
Note: The figure plots the share of Polish speakers in the German Empire Census in 1900 against the share of au-
tochthons in the 1950 Polish Census. The line shows a linear regression with coefficient of 0.83 and a standard error
of 0.07; the R2 is 0.57.
Out-Migration – Intention to Emigrate and Actual Emigration
Figure A.16 plots the self-declared intention to emigrate of Diagnoza respondents in 2015 (col-
lapsed to the regional level) against the share of people who actually emigrated from the same
regions according to the 2011 Polish Census. The latter data are available at the regional level.
The high correlation shown in the figure suggests that intention to emigrate measures something
meaningful, as in previous years the same regions indeed saw larger realized emigration.28 It sup-
ports the validity of the evidence presented in Table 6 in the paper, which shows that the intention
to emigrate does not differ for those with Kresy ancestors.
28A linear regression yields a coefficient of 0.65 with a standard error of 0.18 and an R2 of 0.53.
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Figure A.16: Stated Intent to Emigrate vs. Emigration Rates
Note: The figure plots the share of respondents who intend to emigrate (Diagnoza 2015) against the share of people
who emigrated (from the 2011 Polish Census) at the regional level. The figure also displays a 45-degree line.
Economic Development at Destination
The historical context discussed in Section 2 renders a differential effect of economic development
on migrants from Kresy unlikely: Opportunities in WT were open to both forced and voluntary
migrants, and the Polish government did not treat different groups of migrants differently.
To test systematically whether economic development at destinations matters for our results, we
collected data measuring three different aspects of economic development at destination locations:
1) the density of railways in 1946 (at the county level), 2) the intensity of war-time destruction,
separately in rural and urban areas in 1945 (county level), and 3) industrial production per capita in
1954 (at the regional level).29 We include interaction terms of these variables (standardized) with
the dummy for Kresy origin. The results are presented below in Table A.22. First, we verify that
across regions, historical development is related to education. Column 1 includes the measures
of development in the set of covariates in our baseline regression with Diagnoza data. We do
not include county fixed effects for now, so that the relationship between economic proxies and
29For railway density, we digitized the historical map of the Polish railway system in 1946. Source of the map:
http://maps.mapywig.org/m/Polish_maps/various/Small_scale_maps/MAPA_SIECI_KOLEJOWEJ_RP_1M_1946.jpg
(accessed on July 4, 2019). We then used this map to build a measure of railway density by county equal to the
number of railway stations per square kilometer in 1946. For war destruction, we digitized administrative data by
county on the extent of war-related destruction for rural and urban areas. For rural areas the variable reported by
the authorities is the percent of rural buildings affected or destroyed (out of rural buildings available in 1939), and
for urban areas, the variable is the percent of volume (in cubic meters) of real estate destroyed in WWII out or all
available in 1939. The source of these data is: Zniszczenia wojenne w zabudowie miast i wsi wg stanu w dniu 1 V
1945. 1967. Warszawa: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny. For industrial production per capita in 1954 (at the regional
level), we use the statistical yearbook of that year.
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education can be estimated. Railway density in 1946 (Panel A) and industrial production in 1954
(Panel B) are both strongly positively related to education. We also find that the extent of war
destruction in rural areas (Panel C) is negatively correlated with education levels in the long run.
The opposite holds for war destruction in urban areas (Panel D). Possible explanations are that
economically more important cities (with higher skill demand today) were destroyed more during
WWII and recovered their original importance after the war.30 Importantly, none of these measures
affect the relationship between Kresy origin and education. This is not surprising given that in our
baseline specification, we control for the local environment at destinations by using county or
municipality fixed effects.
In columns 2-5 of Table A.22, we include county fixed effects and focus on the interaction be-
tween Kresy origin and the level of development at destinations. We find no significant differential
effect in any specification in the full sample (column 2). Also, the interaction terms are quanti-
tatively small – at least an order of magnitude below the Kresy coefficient.31 The same is true
for Central Poland (column 3), with the exception of railway density. This is driven by Warsaw
with its very dense railway network – the interaction coefficient becomes insignificant in column
4, where we exclude the capital. Finally, we confirm the results in column 5, where we only look
at Western Territories.
Overall, we do not find a tangible differential effect of the history of forced migration depend-
ing on the level of development at the destination location. It is thus unlikely that our findings are
merely the result of being displaced from a relatively poor (Kresy) to a relatively rich place (West-
ern Territories). Note also that we observe a very similar Kresy effect in Central Poland (which
was also relatively poor) in column 3 and in WT (column 5). This further supports the view that
our results hold independent of economic development at the destination. We are thus confident
about the external validity in other contexts, e.g., where migrants are displaced into equally or even
less developed areas.
30Davis and Weinstein (2002), Waldinger (2016) and others show that cities rebounce quickly after wars.
31Note that all proxies for development are standardized, allowing for a straightforward interpretation of the inter-
action coefficients: A one standard deviation change in the various development proxies is associated with only minor
changes in the coefficient on Kresy ancestry.
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Table A.22: Economic Development at Destination Locations
Dependent variable: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: All Poland All Poland CP CP w/o Warsaw WT
Panel A: Density of railways stations by county (1946)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.848 0.780 0.866 0.855 0.734
(0.073) (0.078) (0.114) (0.116) (0.110)
Railway station density 1946 (std) 0.167
(0.033)
Railway station density 1946 (std) X Kresy 0.094 0.175 0.135 -0.062
(0.067) (0.082) (0.102) (0.116)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.91 11.91 11.94 11.85 11.83
Observations 28,176 28,176 21,121 20,515 7,055
Panel B: Log Industrial Production per capita by region (1954)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.864 0.810 0.932 0.884 0.709
(0.073) (0.075) (0.111) (0.118) (0.104)
Log Industrial Production per capita 1954 (std) 0.044
(0.022)
Log Industrial Production per capita 1954 (std) X Kresy 0.060 0.130 0.085 -0.013
(0.075) (0.097) (0.103) (0.121)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.91 11.91 11.94 11.85 11.83
Observations 28,176 28,176 21,121 20,515 7,055
Panel C: Percent of rural buildings damaged or destroyed during WWII by county (1945)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.704 0.686 0.660 0.660 0.694
(0.086) (0.092) (0.138) (0.138) (0.124)
% rural buildings damg’d or destr’d in WWII (std) -0.061
(0.025)
% rural buildings damg’d or destr’d in WWII (std) X Kresy -0.037 -0.080 -0.080 -0.015
(0.084) (0.135) (0.135) (0.107)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.60 11.60 11.64 11.64 11.46
Observations 19,832 19,832 15,018 15,018 4,814
Panel D: Percent of urban real estate (in m3) damaged or destroyed during WWII by county (1945)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.768 0.743 0.765 0.765 0.723
(0.078) (0.080) (0.125) (0.125) (0.104)
% urban real est. damg’d or destr’d in WWII (std) 0.126
(0.030)
% urban real est. damg’d or destr’d in WWII (std) X Kresy -0.019 0.138 0.138 -0.046
(0.067) (0.155) (0.155) (0.073)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.82 11.82 11.80 11.80 11.87
Observations 22,536 22,536 16,033 16,033 6,503
Notes: The table uses data from Diagnoza. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
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Moving as communities
Table A.23 investigates whether migrants from Kresy tended to move more (or less) together with
people from their origin location, as compared to migrants from Central Poland. We compute, for
each municipality in WT, the number of ancestors in our Ancestry Survey who are from the same
county of origin. We refer to this measure as the ‘size of the local ancestor community.’ This is
likely to be a noisy measure, as it is based on a count within our survey alone. Note also that this
number will mechanically tend to be larger in municipalities for which we have a higher number
of ancestors in our sample. We thus control – for each municipality – for the total ancestors in the
sample.
Table A.23 checks whether the size of local ancestor community is related to the Kresy origin of
migrants, and whether our results are robust to controlling for this measure. Column 1 shows that
there is no relationship between Kresy origin and the size of local ancestor communities. In other
words, Kresy migrants are not more (or less) likely to live in municipalities with many migrants
from the same origin. In column 2, we show that our main result from specification (2) also holds
in the subsample for which we can construct the size of the local ancestor community.32 In column
3, we use the size of the local ancestor community as a control, showing that the relationship
between Kresy origin and educational attainment is essentially unchanged. Finally, columns 4 and
5 show that our results for secondary and higher education are also robust to controlling for the
size of the local ancestor community. Overall, Table A.23 suggests that our results are unlikely to
be driven by variation in the size of the local community of people with common origin.
Other Population Movements
Table A.24 investigates whether other population movements – of other minorities or of later waves
of migration from Kresy – affect our results. As noted in Section 2.2, Poles from Kresy were forced
to resettle within the new Poland. On the other hand, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians
had to leave Poland and resettle in the USSR. Gawryszewski (2005) gives the number of Ukrainians
expelled from Poland during 1945 and 1946. Ukrainians were by far the largest group accounting
for more than 90% of all those expelled from Poland (see Eberhardt, 2000, pp. 57-58). We compute
the share of expelled Ukrainians in the total population by county (powiat).33 There were only 20
counties from which people were forced to move to the USSR – all located in Central Poland.
Column 1 in Table A.24 shows that our Diagnoza results are robust to excluding these counties
from the sample. In column 2, we use the full sample and interact Kresy origin with the share of
local population forced to move to the USSR. The interaction is small and statistically insignificant.
Another potential concern is that our results might differ between the main wave of Kresy mi-
32The smaller sample is explained by two factors: First, to construct the size of the local ancestor community, we
can only use data from our representative sample in the Ancestry Survey (see Section 3.2 and in particular footnote
24 in the paper). We need to exclude the oversample of people with Kresy ancestors to avoid that the community size
from Kresy is overestimated. Second, we only compute the size of the local ancestor community for migrants from
Kresy and Central Poland. We exclude ancestors from WT because these are autochthons, while the focus here is on
migrant communities. In addition, we exclude ancestors from abroad because the community variable is undefined for
them.
33The source of these data is the provisional (“summary”) 1946 Polish census. This census cannot be used to
measure population movements from Kresy, because they were not completed by 1946. However, the 1946 census is
the only source containing county-level information for groups that were expelled from Poland.
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Table A.23: Size of Ancestor Communities in each Municipality: Ancestor-Level Data
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Size of local Years of education Secondary Higher
ancestor community# education education
Ancestor from Kresy -0.026 0.421 0.421 0.052 0.031
(0.257) (0.113) (0.112) (0.019) (0.017)
Size of ancestor community# -0.040 -0.008 -0.004
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
Total ancestors in sample 0.011 -0.002 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Ancestor Controls† X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 2.52 13.12 13.12 0.57 0.28
R2 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.25
Observations 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093
Notes: The table uses data from our Ancestry Survey. Regressions are run at the ancestor level; robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
† Ancestor controls include indicators for ancestors from Western Territories and from abroad, as well as indicators
for the ancestor generation. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
# This variable is constructed for each municipality in our Ancestry Survey sample. It measures the total number of
ancestors who came from the same county of origin.
gration (until 1950) and the so-called second repatriation of Poles from the USSR in 1955-1959,
when Poles still remaining in Kresy were forced to move. We generate the share of Kresy mi-
grants who came during the second wave of migration among all Kresy migrants, at the level of
region (voivodship), as reported in Hryciuk (2008, p.101).34 This second and final wave of expul-
sion makes up only 10.6% of total migration from Kresy. In column 3, we interact this variable
with the individual Kresy origin dummy and show that it is quantitatively small and statistically
insignificant. Thus, the second wave of migration did not have a significantly different effect on
education than the first (main) wave after WWII.
VII.3 Recall Bias: Missing Information about Ancestor Origin Locations
Table A.25 examines the role of missing information about ancestors in our 2016 Ancestry Survey
in the Western Territories. We compute the share of ancestors with missing information as follows
for each respondent: Let Na(i) be the number of ancestors for whom respondent i reported the
location of origin. Remember that our Ancestry Survey asked for information about the generation
34As we discussed earlier, expulsions from Kresy in the immediate aftermath of WWII were nearly universal in
urban areas and in the Ukrainian SSR, but not necessarily in rural areas. Kresy migrants in the second repatriation
arrived mainly from these rural areas.
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Table A.24: Further population movements: Diagnoza Data
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: Years of education
Sample: Counties without
expulsion of Ukrainians All counties
Ancestor from Kresy 0.839 0.823 0.819
(0.077) (0.075) (0.074)
Share Ukrainians expelled (std) x Kresy -0.052
(0.051)
Share 1955-59 migrants among Kresy migrants (std) x Kresy 0.075
(0.078)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X
Respondent County FE X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.96 11.91 11.91
Observations 26,306 28,176 28,028
Notes: The table uses data from Diagnoza. Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural
places and urban counties.
of ancestors who were the youngest adults in the respondent’s family in 1939. For this generation,
let Nmax(i) denote the maximum possible number of ancestors (e.g., Nmax(i) = 4 for the grand-
parent generation). Then, the share of i’s ancestors for whom information is missing is given by
1−Na(i)/Nmax(i).
Column 1 in Table A.25 shows that missing information on ancestors is unrelated to Kresy ori-
gin in our baseline Ancestry Survey regression (which is run at the respondent level – see column
2, Panel A, in Table 3 in the paper). More specifically, the excluded category in this regression is
the share of ancestors from Central Poland. Thus, the zero coefficient on the share of Kresy an-
cestors means that respondents with ancestors from Kresy are just as likely as those with ancestors
from Central Poland to remember their ancestors. This makes it unlikely that any of our results
are confounded by missing information on ancestors. Note also that the mean of the dependent
variable in column 1 is 0.09. That is, the share of ancestors with missing information is only 9% in
our Ancestry Survey. Finally, the coefficient on the share of ancestors from WT in column 1 is neg-
ative and significant, meaning that respondents are more likely to remember the location of their
ancestors in the Western Territories. This is not surprising, given that our survey was conducted in
WT.
In the remaining columns in Table A.25, we use our education measures as outcome variables.
Column 2 shows that there is a significantly negative relationship between years of education and
the share of missing ancestor information. This is what one would expect: More educated respon-
dents tend to be better informed about their ancestors. Columns 3-5 replicate the specification
from columns 3, 7, and 8 in Panel A of Table 3 in the paper, adding the share of missing ancestor
information as an additional control. The coefficients on the share of Kresy ancestors are literally
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unchanged. Thus, missing information about ancestor origin locations does not confound our re-
sults. This is also true when we use weights to accout for over-sampling of Kresy respondents, as
can be seen in A.26.
Table A.25: Accounting for Missing Ancestor Information in the Ancestry Survey
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Share missing Years of education Secondary Higher
ancestor info† education education
Share of Ancestors, Kresy -0.004 0.746 0.104 0.053
(0.008) (0.125) (0.020) (0.017)
Share of Ancestors, WT -0.041 -1.025 -0.176 -0.134
(0.014) (0.179) (0.029) (0.023)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -0.098 -0.696 -0.020 -0.050
(0.033) (0.629) (0.099) (0.091)
Share of Ancestors, rural 0.002 -0.834 -0.107 -0.071
(0.008) (0.135) (0.021) (0.019)
Share missing ancestor info† -0.882 -0.969 -0.166 -0.125
(0.243) (0.244) (0.043) (0.036)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.09 12.72 12.72 0.52 0.23
R2 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.20
Observations 3,661 3,661 3,661 3,661 3,661
Notes: The table examines the role of missing information about ancestors in our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the
Western Territories. Columns 3-5 replicate the specification from columns 2, 5, and 6 in Panel A of Table 3 in the
paper, adding the share of missing ancestor information as an additional control. Regressions are run at the respondent
level; robust standard errors in parenthesis.
† For each respondent, the share of ancestors with missing information is computed specific to the generation
of ancestors who were the youngest adults in the respondent’s family in 1939. For example, if those were the
grandparents, and the historical location for three out of four grandparent is known, then the share missing is 0.25.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as
indicators for respondents living in rural locations and urban counties.
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Table A.26: Accounting for Missing Ancestor Information in the Ancestry Survey - Using Sam-
pling Weights
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Share missing Years of education Secondary Higher
ancestor info† education education
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 0.002 0.810 0.111 0.067
(0.010) (0.137) (0.021) (0.017)
Share of Ancestors, WT -0.056 -1.052 -0.169 -0.136
(0.016) (0.189) (0.031) (0.023)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -0.105 -1.181 -0.048 0.002
(0.040) (0.835) (0.109) (0.096)
Share of Ancestors, rural 0.003 -0.462 -0.058 -0.034
(0.011) (0.159) (0.024) (0.019)
Share missing ancestor info† -0.606 -0.782 -0.129 -0.104
(0.273) (0.271) (0.047) (0.038)
Baseline Controls‡ X X X X X
Respondent County FE X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.12 12.45 12.45 0.47 0.22
R2 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.21 0.22
Observations 3,661 3,661 3,661 3,661 3,661
Notes: The table examines the role of missing information about ancestors in our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the
Western Territories. Columns 3-5 replicate the specification from columns 2, 5, and 6 in Panel A of Table 3 in the
paper, adding the share of missing ancestor information as an additional control. Regressions are run at the respondent
level; robust standard errors in parenthesis.
† For each respondent, the share of ancestors with missing information is computed specific to the generation
of ancestors who were the youngest adults in the respondent’s family in 1939. For example, if those were the
grandparents, and the historical location for three out of four grandparent is known, then the share missing is 0.25.
‡ Baseline controls include respondents’ gender, age and age2 interacted with birth-decade dummies, as well as
indicators for respondents living in rural locations and urban counties.
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Quick Guide to Identification and Mechanisms
The following is a brief guide to identification concerns as well as to potential mechanisms and
potential alternative explanations behind the main result in the paper. We start with a table that
summarizes identification concerns. After that, we present a table that summarizes historical and
empirical evidence for the most likely mechanism behind our finding. We then present a further
table that discusses our proposed mechanism, as well as alternative mechanisms, together with
historical and empirical evidence that renders these alternative mechanisms unlikely.
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Identification Concerns: 1. Pre-Existing Differences
People from Kresy may have had higher education or different preferences for education already before WWII,
or characteristics of ancestral place of origin or differential experiences during WWII could have let to




H: Section 2.1 Same access to education for Poles in Kresy and CP before WWII (it was the same
country). Also, no discrimination against Poles in Kresy.
E: Figure 3 and col-
umn 1 in Table A.3
No difference in education for Kresy migrants among the pre-1930 cohort (that had
finished schooling by the time of expulsions).
E: Figure 4 and Table
A.10
RDD along the Kresy border (note that this border was arbitrarily drawn – see Section
2.1 under heading “Arbitrariness of the Kresy border of 1945”). Diagnoza Survey: i) No
difference in pre-WWII education along Kresy border. ii) Kresy descendants are more
educated than descendants of inhabitants (“stayers”) to the West of the Kresy border.
The remaining possibility is that “stayers” were negatively selected. This is addressed
by Figure 5 (see next point).
E: Figure 5 and Table
A.11
RDD along the Kresy border. Ancestry Survey: Comparing individuals within munici-
palities in WT. Kresy descendants are more educated than descendants of movers from
the area to the West of the Kresy border. In combination, Figures 4 and 5 make it unlikely
that selection drove our results.∗
E: Figure A.14 and Ta-
ble A.12
Our main result holds even when restricting the sample to counties that fell into the
contested area of the Kresy border and could thus have either become part of Poland or
of the Soviet Union. See Appendix V.4.∗
E: Tables A.13 & A.14 Socio-Economic and Geographic Characteristics Pre-existing differences at ancestral
county of origin might lead to differential education benefits from being forcefully
moved. Interaction terms of Kresy origin with county-level characteristics of ances-
tral place of origin are statistically not significant and have small coefficient sizes. That
is, the Kresy education effect does not vary with location characteristics.
E: Table A.15 Differential War Exposure or Victimization? While Kresy ancestors were more likely
to have been victimized during WWII, controlling for a family history of victimization
does not affect our results.
∗ Note: This point holds unless one reverts to the following (unlikely) explanation – a mix between a story of
pre-existing skills and selection: Outmigration from the area in CP to the West of the Kresy border could have been
such that i) unskilled migrants moved to WT; ii) skilled migrants moved to other places in CP. Point i) would explain
Figure 5. Also, if flow ii) was large, the stayers to the West of the Kresy border would be less educated, explaining
Figure 4. Note that (in addition to the purely speculative presumption about skill-biased migration, which cannot be
examined in the data and for which there is no historical evidence), this would require a larger outflow from the area
to the West of the Kresy border to CP than to WT (only this would yield relatively less educated stayers). To check
this, we use the 1950 Census and examine outmigration from Polish regions (voivodeships) next to the Kresy border
(to its West) to other regions in CP and in WT. We find that the overall flow from the area to the West of the Kresy
border to CP was 4.6%, while the outflow to WT was 14.7%. Thus, the overall flow from the area to the West of the
Kresy border to CP was much smaller (less than one-third) than the flow to WT. Consequently, the alternative
interpretation outlined at the beginning of this note is not compatible with the data.
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Identification Concerns: 2. Selection





H: Section 2 E: Table
4
Selection into migration from Kresy? The historical narrative clearly speaks against
selection out of Kresy: The vast majority of ethnic Poles in Kresy had no choice but to
leave Kresy. This is particularly true for urban areas and for Ukraine. In Table 4, we
confirm that our results hold equally in urban vs. rural areas and in the subset of the
Ukrainian part of Kresy.
E: Tables 1, 2 & A.16 Selection of Kresy migrants into WT vs. CP? Three quarters of Kresy migrants moved
to WT and one quarter to CP (Table 1). Did the most able Kresy migrants move to WT,
explaining why Kresy migrants in WT are more educated? The answer is ‘no:’ Table 2
(columns 5 and 6) show that the coefficients on Kresy ancestry are, if anything, larger
in CP than in WT. Table A.16 performs an additional check, showing that respondents
with Kresy origin are somewhat less educated in WT than in CP. This confirms that, if
anything, our results for the Western Territories are a lower bound on the effect of Kresy
origin.
E: Tables A.17 and
A.18
Selection of voluntary migrants from CP to WT? First, note that this type of selection
would not affect our results for Poland overall (Table 2). We present two analyses,
showing that both regional and individual selection of voluntary migrants is unlikely to
affect our results within WT (i.e., from our Ancestry Survey). On regional selection,
see Table A.17, and on individual selection, see Table A.18 and the corresponding de-
scription in the appendix text. For both, we find that if anything, the evidence points to
positive selection of voluntary migrants from CP, which would imply smaller effects of
Kresy origin.
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Most Likely Mechanism:
Our empirical findings suggest that our main result is driven by a shift in preferences from investing in
physical possessions towards investment in human capital, as a consequence of the loss of physical belongings




H: Section 1 – Intro-
duction
Memoirs written by Kresy migrants in the Western Territories in the 1950s suggest a
change in preferences towards education in the aftermath of forced migration, for exam-
ple: “In Western Territories, there was a specific situation. People did not attach great
importance to material wealth. ... In a new life situation, the cult of new values emerged,
i.e., values that are indestructible, that cannot be lost, and that die with the man – the
cult of knowledge, of skills, which can resist cataclysms.” This is also supported by inter-
views with descendants of forced migrants, e.g., with the former president Komorowski
who stated: “At home, nobody attached any importance to the material side, because
everything that was valuable had been lost.”
H/E: Section 2.3 Historical evidence by sociologist Irena Turnau suggests an immediate shift towards
higher school enrolment among children of Kresy migrants after the expulsion. Turnau
assembled data on schooling in Wrocław (the former German Breslau) in 1948. She
found that children of Kresy migrants were over-represented among secondary school
students, and even more so among students in higher education.
E: Figure 3 and Table
A.3
Cohort-specific empirical evidence shows that this immediate shift is also true for ed-
ucational attainment: The education effect is not present for forced migrants who had
completed schooling before they were forced to migrate; while it is present for children
of forced migrants who had the chance to complete education after migration.
E: Table 5 Evidence from the large-scale Diagnoza Survey shows that descendants of forced mi-
grants value material goods less, while having a stronger aspiration for education of
their children. They also possess fewer physical assets, relative to the number of physi-
cal assets they can afford. These results hold even when controlling for the level of edu-
cation of the individual respondents, suggesting that different preferences among Kresy
descendants drive the results (as opposed to Kresy descendants’ higher own education
explaining their aspiration for their children’s education).
E: Appendix VII.1 The shift in preferences in Table 5 could be founded on a number of underlying reasons:
a shift in the subjective probability individuals attach to being forced to migrate in the
future; an increase in the subjective probability that bad things may happen, so that
education serves as insurance; a shift in the willingness to take risks; a shift in discount
rates; and a shift in the valuation of education per se. We discuss those in Appendix
VII.1. Overall, we conclude that our results are likely driven by a combination of two
factors: 1) an increase in the value of education and 2) an increase in the salience of
potential negative events occurring in the future.
Literature: Section 1 Our preferred interpretation of the results is consistent with a robust body of existing
evidence that describes how individual preferences change in response to exposure to
violence, natural disasters, or economic shocks. Recent evidence suggests that these
effects persist in future generations. We cite over a dozen related publications in the
Introduction.
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H: Section 2.2 Differential access at destination: The historical narrative is clear: in Western Territories
(ex-German areas), there was equal access to education, land, houses, and productive as-
sets for Poles from Kresy and CP. There was neither affirmative action for Kresy people
nor discrimination against them.
E: Table 6 Differential congestion: Locations in Western Territories with a higher share of au-
tochthons might generate congestion that limits access to assets. However, Table 6
suggests that there is no differential effect of such potential congestion on education
of Kresy migrants. Underlying this finding is the fact that Kresy migrants were not
systematically resettled to areas in WT with more/fewer autochthons.
E: Figure A.6 Differences in time of arrival in WT generating differences in access to assets: Voluntary
migrants from Central Poland were closer to Western Territories and might have grabbed
the best opportunities before Kresy migrants arrived. This would be a story of congestion
for Kresy migrants because of fast-moving CP migrants. However, Figure A.6 suggests
that CP and Kresy migrants arrived into WT in parallel throughout.
E: various tables: lo-
cation fixed effects
Differential assignment to locations: We routinely use county fixed effects or even mu-
nicipality fixed effects, i.e., we compare survey respondents within the same location. If
different groups of migrants were assigned differently to different locations, our within-
location comparison removes such worry.
E: Tables 2 and A.18 Differential assignment within locations: Voluntary migrants may have been attracted
by the promise that they would receive land, potentially making it more likely that they
were given land and thus worked in agriculture within destination locations. This is
unlikely, given that our results hold within the subsample of urban locations. In urban
municipalities, the share of farmers among all occupations is smaller than 1%.
E: Table 6 Differential returns to schooling: Maybe Kresy migrants got different returns to school-
ing, giving them extra incentives to acquire more education? The answer is ‘no.’ We do
not find evidence for different returns to schooling for descendants of Kresy migrants.
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E: Table 6 Differential out-migration: If uneducated people with Kresy origin (or educated people
without Kresy origin) were more likely to leave Poland, then this could bias the coeffi-
cient on Kresy upwards. We find no differential rates of out-migration.
E: Table 6 Differential fertility: Kresy migrants may have chosen lower fertility to remain more
flexible in an environment that they perceived as highly volatile. Fewer offspring could
then have enabled higher investment in each child’s human capital. This is not the case:
Fertility is uncorrelated with Kresy origin.
E: Table A.22 Economic Development at Destination Locations: The ex-German territories were more
developed than Kresy before WWII. Did Kresy migrants benefit differentially more from
moving to ‘better places’? We find no evidence for such a mechanism – the Kresy effect
does not vary with development at destinations.
E: Table A.23 Moving as Communities: Kresy migrants might be more likely to have moved in groups
from the same location of origin. If moving in groups was beneficial to their descen-
dants’ education, this may have reinforced the education effect. However, we do not
find such effects.
E: Table A.24 Other Population Movements: Not only were Poles expelled from Kresy, but also
Ukrainian and Belorussian minority groups were expelled from Poland to the USSR.
Controlling for this does not affect our results.
E: Table A.25 Recall Bias: Missing Information About Ancestor Origin Locations: More educated
respondents may have more information on the location of origin of their ancestors.
However, i) the share of ancestors with missing information is uncorrelated with Kresy
origin, and ii) controlling for this share does not affect our results.
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